

Азия/Европа

Ақпараттық-сараптама журналы

Сәуір 2016 жыл №04

AVRASYA ARAŞTIRMA ENSTİTÜSÜNÜN AYLIK YAYINIDIR ЕУРАЗИЯ ҒЫЛЫМИ-ЗЕРТТЕУ ИНСТИТУТЫНЫҢ АЙ САЙЫН ШЫҒАРАТЫН БАСЫЛЫМЫ

IRAN'S POLITICAL SYSTEM: THE CASE OF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

ПОЛИТИЧЕСКАЯ СИСТЕМА ИРАНА:

НА ПРИМЕРЕ
ПАРЛАМЕНТСКИХ
ВЫБОРОВ



**CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES' POWER
SYSTEMS ARE NOW ISOLATED, BUT
NOT EVERYONE IS HAPPY!**

ЭНЕРГОСИСТЕМЫ СТРАН ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЙ АЗИИ
ТЕПЕРЬ ИЗОЛИРОВАНЫ, НО ЭТО НЕ ВСЕХ
УСТРАИВАЕТ!

DR. FARKHOD AMINJONOV

04

**CHINESE VIEW ON THE
EXPANSION OF THE SHANGHAI
COOPERATION ORGANIZATION**

КИТАЙСКОЕ ВИДЕНИЕ РАСШИРЕНИЯ
ШАНХАЙСКОЙ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ
СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВА

DR. AZHAR SERIKKALIYEVA

20

**США И КУБА:
ПРИМЕНЕНИЕ НА
ПРАКТИКЕ ИСКУССТВА
ЦИВИЛИЗОВАННОГО
СОСУЩЕСТВОВАНИЯ**

DR. ERKIN BAYDAROV

56

Asya Avrupa / Азия Еуропа
(Haber – Yorum) / (Ақпараттық – сараптама)

Avrasya Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınıdır
Еуразия ғылыми-зерттеу институты басылымы

Nisan 2016 Sayı: 04
Сәуір 2016 жыл №04

Sahibi / Меншік иесі
Ahmet Yesevi Üniversitesi Avrasya Araştırma Enstitüsü Müdürü
Ахмет Ясауи университеті Еуразия ғылыми-зерттеу институты директоры
Doç. Dr. Nevzat Şimşek

Genel Yayın Yönetmeni / Бас редактор
Dr. Aidarbek Amirbek

Sorumlu Yazı İşleri Müdürü / Жауапты редактор
Dr. Assemgul Zhumagulova

Haber Müdürü / Жаңалықтарға жауапты редактор
Doç. Dr. Hayal Ayça Şimşek

Tercüme Ekibi / Аудармашылар тобы
Dr. Assemgul Zhumagulova
Dr. Azhar Serikkaliyeva
Saule Akhmetkaliyeva
Dinara Taldybayeva
Akбота Akylbayeva
Cengizhan Canaltay

Sekretarya / Хатшылық
Banu Alipbekova

Teknik Redaksiyon / Техникалық редакторлар
Kanat Makhanov
Aidana Arynbeke

Yayın Kurulu / Редакция алқасы
Doç. Dr. Nevzat Şimşek
Doç. Dr. Hayal Ayça Şimşek
Dr. Aidarbek Amirbek
Dr. Farkhod Aminjonov
Dr. Erkin Baydarov
Lidiya Parchomchik

Tasarım / жобалау
Merkez Repro
+90 312 384 78 98 - www.merkezrepro.com

Yönetim Merkezi / Басқару орталығы
Almalı Audanı, Mametova 48, 050004
Almaty, Kazakhstan
Tel. +7 (727) 279 97 94
Fax. +7 (727) 279 97 94
E-mail: info@eurasian-research.org

Haber-yorum ve analizlerde ifade edilen görüşler yazarların kendi görüşleri olup
Enstitü'nün yayın politikasını yansıtmamaktadır. Kaynak gösterilerek alıntı yapılabilir.

"Ақпараттық-сараптама" және "Өзекті пікір" айдарларымен шыққан мақала авторларының
пікірлері институт көзқарасын білдірмейді. Журналда жарияланған материалдарды
институттың рұқсатынсыз көшіріп басуға болмайды.

DOÇ. DR. NEVZAT ŞİMŞEK

Merhabalar,

Asya Avrupa dergimizin dördüncü sayısı ile karşınızdayız. Avrasya bölgesinin tüm dünya ülkelerinin ilgisini çekmesine paralel olarak yayınlarımıza da artan ilgi bizleri memnun etmektedir. Avrasya Bölgesiyle ilgili haberleri yorumlayarak veren bir dergi olarak AsyaAvrupa dergimize bu şekilde devam etmek arzusundayız. Bu sayımızda yine çeşitli konularda 30 civarında haber-yorum yayınlayarak okuyucularımıza Avrasya bölgesi ile ilgili bilgiler vermeye gayret ettik.

Ayrıca yine üç farklı konuda analizleri de okuyucularla paylaşmayı uygun gördük. Bu analizlerden bir tanesinde Şangay İşbirliği Örgütü'nün genişlemesi konusunda Çin'in bakış açısı ele alındı. Bilindiği gibi Nisan 1996 yılında Çin ile komşu olan Rusya, Kazakistan, Kırgızistan ve Tacikistan arasında, sınır anlaşmazlıklarını çözmek ve sınır güvenliğini inşa etmek amacıyla Şangay Beşlisi platformu şeklinde başlayan süreç sonrasında Haziran 2001'de Şangay İşbirliği Örgütü'ne dönüşen yapılanma, bölge ülkelerinin ilgisini çekmeye devam etmekte ve giderek üyelik talepleri artmaktadır. Bu nedenle Şangay İşbirliği Örgütü'nün genişleme konusunda, inisiyatif sahibi Çin'in bakış açısını yayınlamak ilgi çekici olacaktır diye düşündük.

Bölgenin enerji güvenliğı açısından karşılıklı bağımlılığa vurgu yapılması ve enerji güvenliğini ilgilendiren politikaların incelenmesi, gelecekte yapılabilecekler ile ilgili olası tartışma platformlarına da ışık tutacaktır. Bu nedenle genellikle tüm sayılarımızda bu konuya ayrıca önem vermekteyiz. Enerji ihraç eden ülkelerin Rusya gibi tek bir ülkeye olan yüksek bağımlılıktan kurtulması ne kadar önemli ise, alternatif güzergah bağlamında Çin'e yüksek bağımlılık oluşturulması da enerji güvenliğı bağlamında bir o kadar istenmeyen bir durum olacaktır. Bu nedenle güzergah çeşitliliğinin sağlanması için bir boyutunu oluştururken, çoğu Türk dili konuşan ülkeler olan Orta Asya Ülkelerinin su ve hidrokarbon ticareti konusunda karşılıklı bağımlılığı Türk Keneşi başta olmak üzere ortak platformlarda tartışılıp işbirliği mekanizmaları oluşturulmalıdır.

Son olarak incelediğimiz diğer bir konuda İran'ın politik sistemi olmuştur. Bu bilgilendirici analizi de, yararlı olacağı düşüncesiyle okuyucularımızla paylaşmayı amaçladık.

Yorum ve değerlendirmeleriniz bizler için değerlidir. Mayıs sayısında da buluşmayı ümit ediyoruz...

Қадірлі де құрметті оқырман қауым!

«Азия Еуропа» журналымыздың төртінші саны назарларыңызға ұсынылып отыр. Еуразия аймағы бүкіл дүниежүзі елдерінің назарын аудартып отырғаны бәрімізге белгілі. Басылымымызға деген артқан қызығушылық бізді қуанытып отыр. Еуразия аймағына қатысты жаңалықтарға сараптама жүргізген басылым ретінде «Азия Еуропа» журналымызды осылайша жариялай береміз деген ниеттеміз. Журналдың осы санында тағы да әртүрлі тақырыпта 30-дан астам ақпараттық сараптама жасап, оқырмандарымыздың назарына Еуразия аймағына қатысты ақпаратты ұсынуға бар күшімізді салдық.

Түрлі тақырыптағы үш сараптаманы оқырмандармен бөлісуді жөн көрдік. Бұл сараптамалардың бірінде Шанхай ынтымақтастық ұйымының кеңейтілуіне қатысты Қытай көзқарасы зерттелді. Өздеріңізге белгілі болғандай, 1996 жылдың сәуір айында Қытаймен шекаралас Ресей, Қазақстан, Қырғызстан және Тәжікстан арасында шекара дауларын шешу және шекара қауіпсіздігін құру мақсатында «Шанхай бестігі» тұғырнамасы ретінде басталған үдерістен кейін 2001 жылдың маусым айында Шанхай ынтымақтастық ұйымына айналған қайта ұйымдастыру аймақтағы елдердің назарын аударуда және барған сайын мүшелік талаптары артуда. Сондықтан Шанхай ынтымақтастық ұйымының кеңейтілуіне қатысты бастаманың иесі – Қытайдың көзқарасын жариялауымыз оқырман қауымның қызығушылығын туғызады деген ойдамыз.

Аймақтағы энергетикалық қауіпсіздік тұрғысынан өзара тәуелділікке баса назар аударылуы және энергетикалық қауіпсіздікке байланысты саясаттың зерттелуі болашақта жүзеге асырылуы ықтимал талқылау тұғырнамаларын да анықтай түсуі мүмкін. Сондықтан, көбінесе журналымыздың барлық сандарында осы мәселеге аса мән берілуде. Энергия ресурстарын экспорттаушы елдердің Ресей сияқты елге тәуелділігінен құтылуы қаншалықты маңызды болса, балама бағыт жағынан алғанда Қытайға тәуелділіктің қалыптасуы да энергетикалық қауіпсіздік тұрғысынан жағымсыз жағдай болуы мүмкін. Осыған байланысты, бағыт аралуандығының қамтамасыз етілуі жұмыстың бір қырын құрса, көбі түркі тілдес болып табылатын Орта Азия мемлекеттерінің су және көмірсутегі саудасы жөнінде өзара тәуелділігі бірінші ретте Түркі кеңесі сияқты ортақ тұғырнамаларда талқыланып, ынтымақтастық тетіктері қалыптастырылуы тиіс.

Соңғы қарастырылған мәселе Иранның саяси жүйесіне байланысты болды. Бұл ақпараттық талдауды пайдалы болады деген оймен оқырмандармен бөлісуді мақсат тұттық.

Сіздердің сараптама мен бағалауларыңыз біздер үшін аса маңызды. Мамыр айындағы санымызда қайта қауышқанша...

ÖNSÖZ АЛҒЫСӨЗ

*Еуразия ғылыми-зерттеу институтының директоры
Avrasya Araştırma Enstitüsü Müdürü*

Doç. Dr. Nevzat Şimşek01

GÜNCEL ӨЗЕКТІ ПІКІР

*Central Asian Countries' Power Systems Are Now Isolated,
But Not Everyone Is Happy!
Энергосистемы стран Центральной Азии теперь изолированы,
но это не всех устраивает!*

Dr. Farkhod Aminjonov04

*Iran's Political System: The Case of Parliamentary Elections
Политическая система Ирана: на примере парламентских выборов*

Lidiya Parkhomchik10

*Chinese View on the Expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
Китайское видение расширения Шанхайской
организации сотрудничества*

Dr. Azhar Serikkaliyeva20

HABER-YORUM

АҚПАРАТТЫҚ-САРАПТАМА

ПРОТИВОСТОЯНИЕ МЕЖДУ СУННИТАМИ И ШИИТАМИ НА БЛИЖНЕМ ВОСТОКЕ УСИЛИВАЕТСЯ.....	26
MODERNIZATION OF THE ENERGY SYSTEM IN SOUTH KAZAKHSTAN REGION IS PRIORITY!.....	28
THE MEETING OF THE STATE BORDER SERVICE HEADS OF THE CASPIAN SEA STATES.....	30
TURKEY TO BOOST ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP WITH KAZAKHSTAN	31
MÜLTECİ KRİZİNE ÇARE: TÜRKİYE VE AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ARASINDA "BİRE BİR" ANLAŞMASI.....	32
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NORTH POLE RESEARCH STATION IN JEOPARDY.....	34
IRANIAN OIL EXPORTS WILL HIT 2 MILLION BARRELS PER DAY IN COMING MONTHS.....	36
VLADIMIR PUTIN DEFINED RUSSIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH ARMENIA AS A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.....	38
БОРЬБА ПРОТИВ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОГО ТЕРРОРИЗМА ДОЛЖНА СТАТЬ ВСЕОБЩЕЙ.....	40
THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN KERRY'S VISIT TO MOSCOW	42
THE FEDERAL RESERVE KEEPS RATES UNCHANGED	43
18 НАУРЫЗ 2016 ЖЫЛЫ ОРЫН АЛҒАН ҚЫРҒЫЗ-ӨЗБЕК ШЕКАРА МӘСЕЛЕСІ.....	45
ISLANDS OF PLASTIC WASTE HARMING THE MARINE ECOSYSTEM.....	46
RISKS AND DEVELOPMENT IN KAZAKH FINANCIAL MARKETS	48
KYRGYZ-UZBEK BORDER PROBLEMS: THE CASE OF THE CHALASART AREA.....	50
THE BANKING SECTOR OF KAZAKHSTAN INCREASED BY MORE THAN A THIRD OVER THE YEAR.....	51
CHINA-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS IN TERMS OF THE SILK ROAD ECONOMIC BELT.....	53
FUNDS ALLOCATED TO PROTECT LAKE BAIKAL	54
США И КУБА: ПРИМЕНЕНИЕ НА ПРАКТИКЕ ИСКУССТВА ЦИВИЛИЗОВАННОГО СОСУЩЕСТВОВАНИЯ.....	56

ETKİNLİKLER

ІС-ШАРАЛАР

.....	59
-------	----



CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES' POWER SYSTEMS ARE NOW ISOLATED, BUT NOT EVERYONE IS HAPPY!

Dr. Farkhod Aminjonov

ЭНЕРГОСИСТЕМЫ СТРАН ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЙ АЗИИ ТЕПЕРЬ ИЗОЛИРОВАНЫ, НО ЭТО НЕ ВСЕХ УСТРАИВАЕТ!

The Central Asian Power System (CAPS) was established in the 1960s and 1970s. The system consisted of mainly 30 percent hydro power plants (HPP) of Central Asian upstream and 70 percent thermal power plants (TPP) of downstream countries. The Integrated Dispatch Center Energia, based in Tashkent, controlled the electric power supply operations of the CAPS. Even though the CAPS was part of the Unified Energy System of the USSR, physically it was isolated from the Russian electricity grids. Nonetheless, Energia was still subordinate to the Central Dispatch Center based in Moscow and financed by the Ministry of Energy and Electrification of the former Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the CAPS started operating on its own.

Also called the Central Asian "electricity ring," CAPS connected all 83 power units (including 29



Объединенная энергетическая система Центральной Азии (ОЭС ЦА) была основана в 1960-е и 1970-е годы. Система состояла, главным образом, на 30 % из гидроэлектростанций центральноазиатских стран верховья и на 70 % из теплоэлектростанций стран низовья. Координационно-диспетчерский центр «Энергия», расположенный в Ташкенте, управлял действиями по снабжению электроэнергией ОЭС ЦА. Несмотря на то, что ОЭС ЦА была частью Объединенной энергетической системы СССР, физически она была изолирована от российских электросетей. Тем не менее, Координационно-диспетчерский центр (КДЦ) «Энергия» все еще был подчинен



thermal and 48 hydro) of the southern part of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan and was managed by Energiya. Fifty-one percent of total CAPS electricity was generated in Uzbekistan, 13.8 percent in Kyrgyzstan, 9.1 percent in Kazakhstan, 15 percent in Tajikistan, and 10 percent in Turkmenistan. Having gained independence Central Asian governments started pursuing what they call “independent,” which over time turned into “isolationist” energy policies. As a result, some of the countries are now relatively better off, while others failed to achieve energy independence.

The power sector development of Turkmenistan is the most successful example of the independent power systems established after the break down of the CAPS. A countrywide electric power system of



After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the CAPS started operating on its own.

После распада Советского Союза ОЭС ЦА начала работать самостоятельно.



Центральному диспетчерскому центру, расположенному в Москве, и финансировался Министерством энергии и электрификации бывшего Советского Союза. После распада Советского Союза ОЭС ЦА начала работать самостоятельно.

ОЭС ЦА, также называемая центральноазиатским «энергетическим кольцом», включала все 83 энергоблока (включая 29 ТЭС и 48 ГЭС) южной части Казахстана, Кыргызстана, Таджикистана, Туркменистана и Узбекистана и управлялась КДЦ «Энергия». Пятьдесят один процент электроэнергии ОЭС ЦА вырабатывался в Узбекистане, 13,8 процента в Кыргызстане, 9,1

Turkmenistan was established with the interconnection of Ashgabat, Mary, and Charjou electric power grids in 1970. Ten years later, the formation of the centralized Turkmen electric power system was completed. Electricity generation on Mary TPP, with a capacity of 1685 MW, started operating in 1987. In 2011, it produced 9022 million kWh, accounting for 49.4 percent of total electricity production in the country. Currently, there are nine state electric power plants with a capacity of 3984.2 MW to produce electricity in Turkmenistan. Having withdrawn from the CAPS in 2003, Turkmenistan is now increasing its electricity production capacity by building new TPPs. Abundance of natural gas to run gas-fired TPPs and introduction of new generation capacities not only ensured self-sufficiency but also turned the country into exporter of electricity to Iran and Afghanistan.

Kazakhstan is another successful example compared to its Central Asian neighbors. Kazakhstan's electric power grids were designed to operate in parallel with both Russian and the unified Central Asian electric power systems. The power system of the country is divided into three zones: northern zone (Akmola, Aktube, Kostanay, Pavlodar, North-Kazakhstan, East-Kazakhstan, Karaganda); southern zone (Almaty, Zhambyl, Kyzylorda, south-Kazakhstan); and western zone (Atyrau, Mangystau, and West-Kazakhstan regions). The southern zone is connected to the electric power grids of not entirely reliable Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Northern regions are supplied with electricity from cheap coal-fired TPPs such as Ekisbastus. Since the northern zone produces 72.7 percent of the total electricity in the country and there is an excess of power generation the north-south 500 kV transmission line was built in 1998 to cover the peak electricity needs of the southern regions of Kazakhstan and to secure itself from unilateral supply cuts from the electric power grids of Uzbekistan. On top of that, to increase power production capacity of the South and South-Eastern regions of the country the government



The power sector development of Turkmenistan is the most successful example of the independent power systems established after the break down of the CAPS.

Развитие энергетического сектора Туркменистана является наиболее успешным примером независимых энергосистем, установленных после разрыва ОЭС ЦА.



процент в Казахстане, 15 процентов в Таджикистане, и 10 процентов в Туркменистане. Получив независимость, центральноазиатские государства начали стремиться к «самостоятельности», которая со временем превратилась в энергетическую политику «изоляции». В результате, некоторые из стран теперь находятся в относительно лучшем положении, в то время как остальные не смогли добиться энергетической независимости.

Развитие энергетического сектора Туркменистана является наиболее успешным примером независимых энергосистем, установленных после разрыва ОЭС ЦА. Единая энергетическая система Туркменистана была образована с объединением электрических сетей Ашхабада, Мары и Чарджоу в 1970 году. Десять лет спустя формирование централизованной туркменской системы электроэнергетики было завершено. Производство электроэнергии на Марыйской ТЭС мощностью 1685 МВт начало действовать в 1987 году. В 2011 году ею было произведено 9022 млн кВт·ч, что составляет 49,4 процента от общего объема производства электроэнергии в стране. В настоящее время в Туркменистане функционируют девять государственных электростанций мощностью 3984.2 МВт для производства электроэнергии. Покинув ОЭС ЦА в 2003 году, Туркменистан стал увеличивать мощность производства электроэнергии за счет строительства новых ТЭС. Изобилие природного газа для управления газовых ТЭС и внедрение новых генерирующих мощностей не только обеспечили самодостаточность,

is also building new power generation facilities such as Zhambyl and Balkhash power plants, thus decreasing Kazakhstan's still existing insignificant dependence on the power supplies from the neighboring countries.

The breakdown of the CAPS, however, hit Tajikistan the most. Tajikistan's domestic energy production almost completely relies on hydro-power sector development. But, due to seasonal variation in hydroelectricity production and limited fossil fuel reserves Tajikistan has never been able to meet its electricity needs all year round and imported power from Uzbekistan in the winter. Uzbekistan's withdrawal from the CAPS and the cut off thermal electricity supply left Tajikistan in complete isolation and severely affected the level of its energy security, especially in winter months. To supply electricity to its northern regions, the government has promoted the construction of the 500 kV South–North and Lolazor–Khatlon 220 kV electricity transmission lines. However, the lines cannot solve the problem of winter electricity deficiency; therefore, the government of Tajikistan has prioritized the construction of the Rogun dam and HPP with the capacity to double the current electricity production volume, which would also allow hydroelectricity generation during the winter period. Yet, Uzbek authorities perceive this project as a threat to the water balance in the region and thus strongly oppose any progress in this direction. Because Tajik authorities do not have sufficient funds to complete the construction and international organizations (Asian Development Bank or World Bank) do not support HPP projects on transboundary rivers without the consent of all countries along the stream, the Rogun remains the goal not yet achieved.

Similarly to the case of Tajikistan, when the power supply within the CAPS was compromised, in order to overcome the consequences of uneven distribution of electricity, the Kyrgyz government has recently put into force the Datka electric power station and completed the Datka–Kemin electric power transmission line connecting the southern and northern parts of the country. However, according to Nikolai Kravcov, member of the Monitoring Council under the Ministry of Energy, Kyrgyzstan will continue to experience electricity supply shortages due to lack of production. And even the Datka–Kemin electric power transmission line will not save Kyrgyzstan from an energy crisis. This transmission line solves the problem of

но и превратили страну в экспортера электроэнергии в Иран и Афганистан.

Казахстан является еще одним успешным примером по сравнению со своими центральноазиатскими соседями. Сети электроснабжения Казахстана были разработаны для того, чтобы параллельно работать как с российскими, так и с единой электроэнергетической системой Центральной Азии. Энергосистема страны разделена на три зоны: северная зона (Акмола, Актөбе, Костанай, Павлодар, Северный Казахстан, Восточный Казахстан, Караганда); южная зона (Алматы, Жамбыл, Кызылорда, Южный Казахстан); и западная зона (Атырау, Мангистау и Западно-казахстанские области). Южная зона подключена к сетям электроснабжения не вполне надежного Узбекистана и Кыргызстана. Северные области обеспечиваются электроэнергией из тепловых электростанций, работающих на дешевом экибастузском угле. Так как северная зона производит 72,7 процента от общего объема электроэнергии в стране и существует избыток выработки электроэнергии, в 1998 году была построена линия электропередачи 500 кВ транзита Север–Юг для того, чтобы удовлетворить пиковые потребности в электроэнергии южные области Казахстана и обезопасить от односторонних сокращений поставок из электрических сетей Узбекистана. Помимо этого, для увеличения мощности производства электроэнергии Южных и Юго-восточных областей страны, правительство также строит новые объекты производства электроэнергии, такие как Жамбылская и Балхашская электростанции, уменьшая тем самым до сих пор существующую незначительную зависимость Казахстана от электроснабжения из соседних стран.

Однако, из-за распада ОЭС ЦА больше всего пострадал Таджикистан. Внутреннее производство энергии в Таджикистане почти полностью зависит от развития гидроэнергетического сектора.

transporting electricity, but does not add electric power-production capacity. Construction of the Upper Naryn HPPs and projected to be the largest Kambarata-1 HPP has been recently suspended due to Russian companies' incapability to allocate the funding.

Since the CAPS was designed irrespective of national borders, due to Uzbekistan's central geographical location, it was economically cost-efficient to establish the network of transmission lines connecting all other countries through the territory of Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan was not only the largest producer of electricity within the CAPS, but also enjoyed the most sophisticated power transmission infrastructure connecting all neighboring countries. Installed capacity of all electric power plants in Uzbekistan exceeds 12 GW, with TPPs contributing almost 11 GW, which equals 50 percent of all generating capacities of the CAPS. TPPs in Uzbekistan are designed to operate in the base-load mode. The peak electric power demand was met from the import of hydroelectricity from the neighboring upstream countries. When Uzbekistan left the CAPS it had to cover its peak demand supplies by increasing electricity production in the TPPs. Taking into account the fact that there has been no gas production boom in the country to run gas-fired TPPs, Uzbekistan is already experiencing electricity shortages and the problem of power insufficiency is escalating.

To sum up, the analysis shows that there are limited opportunities for both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to ensure its energy security on its own in the short- to medium-term. Uzbekistan, withdrawal of which from the CAPS collapsed the whole system, was not expecting that it would lead to serious power supply shortages domestically. While Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are better off than their other counterparts, intra-Central Asian electricity trade would still be beneficial for all states. In this regard, perhaps the most rational choice for all countries would be to restore the CAPS and re-engage in power trading dynamics on a larger scale.



Uzbekistan is already experiencing electricity shortages and the problem of power insufficiency is escalating.

Узбекистан уже испытывает нехватку электричества и проблема недостатка энергии возрастает.



Но, из-за сезонных изменений в производстве гидроэлектроэнергии и ограниченных запасов ископаемых видов топлива, Таджикистан никогда не был в состоянии удовлетворить свои потребности в электроэнергии в течение года и импортировал энергию из Узбекистана в зимний период. Выход Узбекистана из ОЭС ЦА и сокращение поставок термоэлектричества оставили Таджикистан в полной изоляции и серьезно повлияли на уровень ее энергетической безопасности, особенно в зимние месяцы. Для поставки электроэнергии в северные регионы правительство способствовало строительству линий электропередач 500 кВ «Юг-Север» и 220 кВ «Лолазор-Хатлон». Однако линии не могут решить проблему дефицита электроэнергии в зимнее время; поэтому, правительство Таджикистана уделило первостепенное внимание на строительство Рогунской плотины и ГЭС с мощностью, позволяющей удвоить объем производства электроэнергии, которое также позволило бы выработку гидроэлектроэнергии в зимний период. Тем не менее, узбекские власти воспринимают этот проект как угрозу для водного баланса в регионе и тем самым решительно выступают против какого-либо прогресса в этом направлении. Поскольку таджикские власти не имеют достаточных средств для завершения строительства и международные организации (Азиатский банк развития или Всемирный банк) не поддерживают проекты ГЭС на трансграничных реках без согласия всех стран, расположенных вдоль течения реки, Рогун все еще остается не достигнутой целью.

Аналогично случаю Таджикистана, когда электроснабжение в пределах ОЭС ЦА оказалось под угрозой, в целях преодоления последствий неравномерного распределения электричества, кыргызское правительство недавно ввело в действие электростанцию Датка и завершило линию электропередачи «Датка-Кемин», соединяющую южные и северные части страны. Однако по словам Николая Кравцова, члена Наблюдательного совета при Министерстве энергетики, Кыргызстан продолжит испытывать нехватку электроснабжения из-за отсутствия производства. И даже линия электропередачи «Датка-Кемин» не спасет Кыргызстан от энергетического кризиса. Эта линия электропередачи решает проблему транспортировки электроэнергии, но не добавляет электрическую мощность выработки энергии. Строительство Верхне-Нарынских ГЭС и самой крупной в Центральной Азии Камбаратинской ГЭС-1, было недавно приостановлено из-за неспособности российских компаний выделить финансирование.

Поскольку ОЭС ЦА была создана независимо от национальных границ, из-за центрального географического положения Узбекистана было экономически прибыльно создать сеть линий электропередачи, соединяющих все другие страны через территорию Узбекистана. Узбекистан был не только крупнейшим производителем электроэнергии в ОЭС ЦА, но и пользовался самой современной инфраструктурой передачи электроэнергии, соединяющей все соседние страны. Установленная мощность всех электростанций



Perhaps the most rational choice for all countries would be to restore the CAPS and re-engage in power trading dynamics on a larger scale.

Наиболее рациональным решением для всех стран было бы восстановление ОЭС ЦА и возобновление динамики торговли электроэнергией в более крупном масштабе.



Узбекистана превышает 12 ГВт, включая тепловые электростанции общей мощностью 11 ГВт, что составляет 50 процентов всех генерирующих мощностей ОЭС ЦА. Тепловые электростанции Узбекистана разработаны для работы в режиме базовой нагрузки. Пиковый спрос на электроэнергию был удовлетворен от импорта гидроэлектроэнергии из соседних стран верховья. Покинув ОЭС ЦА, Узбекистану пришлось покрыть свои поставки пикового спроса за счет увеличения производства электроэнергии в тепловых электростанциях. Принимая во внимание тот факт, что в стране не было никакого бумажного производства газа для расширения мощности газовых ТЭС, Узбекистан уже испытывает нехватку электричества и проблема недостатка энергии возрастает.

Подводя итог, анализ показывает, что в краткосрочной и среднесрочной перспективе возможности для обеспечения энергетической безопасности Таджикистана и Кыргызстана собственными силами ограничены. Узбекистан, выход которого из ОЭС ЦА разрушил целую систему, не ожидал, что это приведет к серьезной нехватке электроснабжения внутри страны. В то время как Туркменистан и Казахстан находятся более в лучшем положении, чем другие их соседи, торговля электроэнергией между центральноазиатскими странами все еще была бы выгодной для всех государств. В связи с этим, пожалуй, наиболее рациональным решением для всех стран было бы восстановление ОЭС ЦА и возобновление динамики торговли электроэнергией в более крупном масштабе.




IRAN'S POLITICAL SYSTEM: THE CASE OF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Lidiya Parkhomchik

ПОЛИТИЧЕСКАЯ СИСТЕМА ИРАНА: НА ПРИМЕРЕ ПАРЛАМЕНТСКИХ ВЫБОРОВ

Speaking of the political system of Iran the consideration must be given to the fact that the Iranian politics operates within the framework of theocracy. According to the Iranian constitution dated December 1979 and its 1989 amendment, laws and regulations in the country must be based on Islamic ideology, which define Iran as the Islamic Republic with a political order based on Shia Islam. Under these circumstances, ideological and political control over a political system is carried out by the Supreme Leader (Ayatollah) and by clerics who shadow every major function of the state. Combining unelected powerful institutions, controlled by the Supreme Leader, and elected officials such as the President and members of the Parliament, which official name is Consultative Islamic Assembly (Majles-e Shoura-ye Islami or Majlis for short) (Mohammadi, 2013) the political system of Iran confirms its uniqueness and complexity.

Говоря о политической системе Ирана необходимо учитывать тот факт, что иранская политика осуществляется в рамках теократического режима. Согласно иранской Конституции датируемой декабрем 1979 г. и поправкам к ней от 1989 г., вся нормотворческая деятельность в стране должна осуществляться в рамках исламской идеологии. Иран является Исламской Республикой, в основе политического строя которой лежит Ислам шиитского толка. В данных обстоятельствах, идеологический и политический контроль за функционированием политической системы Ирана осуществляется Высшим руководителем (Аятоллой) и представителями клерикальной элиты, которые напрямую и косвенно влияют на принимаемые в государстве решения. Политическая система Ирана представляет собой сложное и уникальное образование ввиду наличия как государственных органов,




www.apps.washingtonpost.com

Figure 1. Iran's political system

Therefore, as has been said, at the top of the Iranian power structure is Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who succeeded Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian Revolution, after his death in 1989. Khomeini and Khamenei are the only two men to have held the office since the founding of the Islamic Republic in 1979. (Frontline, 2014) Since the Supreme Leader sets Iran's major domestic and foreign policies, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei could appoint and dismiss the heads of several influential organizations in the military, the government, the judiciary (Mohammadi, 2013) and the supreme commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. He also appoints half of members of the Council of Guardians, a hardline body of six clerics and six law experts that determine which candidates are qualified to run for public office by checking hopefuls for commitment to Islam, belief in the Velayat-e Faqih and the pillars of Iran's revolution (Reuters, 2016). The Supreme Leader's circle of power is shown in Figure 1.

The President elected for four-year term is the second-highest ranking official in the country. He is head of the executive branch of power and is responsible for ensuring the implementation of the Constitution. While the President is often the

↑



в которых отсутствует институт выборности и которые контролируются Верховным лидером, так и органов с выборными должностными лицами, такими как президент и члены парламента, который носит официальное название Исламский консультативный совет (Меджлис-е шуры-йе Ислами или Меджлис для краткости) (Мохаммади, 2013).

Поэтому, как уже было сказано выше, во главе иранской структуры власти находится аятолла Али Хаменеи, который сменил на данном поприще лидера Иранской революции аятоллу

public face of the Iranian government he helps direct economic policies and social programs and represents Iran in many international forums. The President is assisted by the 10 Vice Presidents, as well as a Cabinet of 18 Ministers. It should be admitted the Majlis should confirm the members of the Council of Ministers.

Iran's Majlis is a unicameral legislature comprised of 290 members who are elected to four-year terms. The Majlis appears to have roles that are similar to the functions of an ordinary Parliament. Parliamentarians draft legislation, ratify international treaties, and approve the country's budget. (Kagan, 2015) The Majlis has the power to summon and to impeach ministers or the President. However, all Majlis bills have to be approved by the conservative Guardian Council. Moreover, the Guardian Council also vets the qualification of candidates for presidency and the Parliament.

It should be noted that there is a special institution, namely, Expediency Council, which is created to resolve deadlocks and conflicts between the Parliament and the Guardian Council. Acting as an advisory body for the Supreme Leader on domestic and foreign policies, the Expediency Council includes public officials such as the President, the Speaker of Majlis and judiciary chief. The Supreme Leader appoints other members of the 39-seat administrative body.

It is important to mention that the Supreme Leader also has a right to appoint half of members of the Assembly of Experts. Other half of members of the 86-seat Assembly are elected by direct popular vote every eight years. The Assembly of Experts is supposed to monitor the performance of the Supreme Leader and to remove him if he is deemed incapable or corrupted. (Mohammadi, 2013)

Therefore, the duality can be indicated as specific feature of the Iranian politics.



It should be admitted the Majlis should confirm the members of the Council of Ministers.

Следует отметить, что Меджлис имеет право утверждать членов Совета министров.



Рухолла Мусави Хомейни после его смерти в 1989 г. Нужно отметить, что с момента основания Исламской Республики в 1979 г. лишь Хомейни и Хаменеи занимали данный почетный пост (Frontline, 2014). Поскольку Верховный руководитель определяет основные направления внутренней и внешней политики Ирана, аятолла Али Хаменеи может назначать и отстранять от занимаемой должности глав силовых ведомств, государственных телевизионных и радио-каналов, правительственных и судебных институтов (Мохаммади, 2013), а также верховного главнокомандующего Корпуса стражей исламской революции. Он также назначает половину членов Совета стражей конституции, состоящего из 6 представителей исламского духовенства и 6 экспертов в области права, которые определяют, какие кандидаты квалифицированы, чтобы баллотироваться на государственные должности, путем проверки претендентов на приверженность исламской системе ценностей, принципу «веляят-е факих» и основам Иранской революции (Reuters, 2016).

В свою очередь, Президент, избираемый на четырехлетний срок, является вторым по значимости высокопоставленным должностным лицом в стране. Он является главой исполнительной власти и несет ответственность за обеспечение исполнения положений Конституции. Являясь публичным лицом иранского правительства, Президент определяет курс экономической политики и социальных программ, представляя Иран в различных международных форумах. В кабинет президента входят 10 вице-президентов, а также главы 18 министерств. Следует отметить, что Меджлис имеет право утверждать членов Совета министров.

Меджлис Ирана представляет собой однопалатный законодательный орган, состоящий из 290 членов, которые избираются на четырехлетний

The executive branch has functions and responsibilities that are divided between the Supreme Leader and the President. The Guardian Council and the Majlis also share similar responsibilities as legislative bodies. The armed forces are divided into the regular army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp and, within the judiciary, there is a separate court that deals specifically with cases involving deviant clerics (Special Court for the Clergy or *Dadgah-e Vizhe Royhaniyoun*). (Kamrava & Hassan-Yari, 2004)

Therefore, the Iran's politics should be understood in the context of hybrid political system combining elements from both democratic and authoritarian systems. (Gilsin, 2016) In fact, parliamentary and presidential elections have become an integral part of the Iranian political landscape. Therefore, elections, have become the wildcard of Iranian politics. For instance, recent twin elections for the Majlis and the Assembly of Experts held on February 26, 2016, demonstrated the tight race between the contending candidates. Actually, the election process in Iran has its unique distinctive feature. For instance, despite the fact that according to the Interior Ministry of Iran, there are over 250 registered political parties in the country, they have no detailed platforms and disciplined membership. There is actually no strategy for linking the electorate to the party. (Razavi, 2010)

Therefore, the absence of strong political parties in Iran makes it difficult to understand how politics is actually organized and to identify the affiliation of an Iranian politician. As the political environment of the country has not been conducive to create the political parties, political factionalism has dominated Iran's post-revolutionary era. (Alem, 2011)

Typical forms of political organizations in Iran include shifting alliances between political groups and prominent individuals, key socio-economic



The duality can be indicated as a specific feature of the Iranian politics.

Специфической особенностью организации иранской политической системы является дублирование полномочий.



срок. Меджлис выполняет функции аналогичные функциям обычного парламента. Парламентарии разрабатывают и утверждают законопроекты, ратифицируют международные договоры, а также утверждают бюджет страны. (Каган, 2015) Меджлис имеет право объявить импичмент, выразив недоверие главам министерств или Президенту. Однако, все законопроекты, разработанные Меджлисом, должны быть одобрены Советом стражей конституции. Кроме того, Совет определяют квалификацию кандидатов, претендующих на должности Президента и членов Парламента.

Следует отметить, что для разрешения ситуаций недопонимая и открытых конфликтов между Меджлисом и Советом стражей конституции был создан специализированный орган, а именно Совет целесообразности. Действуя в качестве консультативного органа для Верховного руководителя по вопросам внутренней и внешней политики, Совет целесообразности состоит таких должностях лиц, как Президент, Спикер Меджлиса и Верховный судья. Верховный руководитель обладает полномочиями назначать остальных членов 39-местного административного органа.

Важно отметить, что Верховный руководитель также имеет право назначать половину членов Совета экспертов. Оставшаяся половина членов Совета, состоящей из 86 места, избирается прямым всеобщим голосованием каждые восемь лет. Совет экспертов уполномочен назначать и смещать Верховного руководителя, в случае если он будет признан неспособным выполнять свои обязанности или будет скомпрометирован. (Мохаммади, 2013)

Таким образом, специфической особенностью организации иранской политической системы является

constituencies, and centers of power. (Majlis Monitor, 2016) In order to simplify the political situation in the country all policy-makers are divided into two broad camps, namely, moderate and hardline (or principlist) camps.

A coalition of reformists, centrists or pragmatic conservatives together form the moderate camp, which is more ready to confront the policy of hardliners. (The Guardian, 2016) The alliance is made up of members of dozens of parties, including the Union of Islamic Iran People Party, Nedaye Iranian, Iranian-Islamic Freedom Party, Association of Combatant Clerics, Islamic Labor Party and Moderation and Development Party, etc. Moreover, falling in the middle of Iran's political spectrum, centrists, most notably, the parliament speaker, Ali Larijani, also expressed their intention to join the moderate camp during elections. Therefore, the main objective of working together is to minimize vote splitting and to maximize their chances of winning.

In contrast to the moderates, the hardliner camp includes loyalists to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, emphasizing Islamic social values and supporting a free market economy, influential clerics, the elite Revolutionary Guards and powerful bazaar merchants. The coalition includes various parties like the Devotees and Path-seekers of the Islamic Revolution, the Front of Islamic Revolution Stability, Islamic Coalition Party and the Association of Combatant Clergy. (Reuters, 2016)

However, such a division of parliamentarian's affiliation is conditional. For instance, in major cities like Tehran, politicians can appear as supporters of the reforms-oriented parties on certain issues, but at the same time, be their opponents on other issues. Therefore, it is quite natural for Iran that parliamentarians could be working closely with both principlists and moderates.

Turning to the results of the elections for the Majlis, it should be mentioned that there have been a significant increase in the number of parliamentarians from the moderate camp. Consequently, in the next Majlis the President Hassan Rouhani, who is widely considered a moderate, will enjoy the support of candidates who secured a nuclear deal with the Western powers, and who has pushed an opening, at least economically, to the rest of the world. (Gilsin, 2016)

↑



www.img.tyt.by

дублирование полномочий. Функции и обязанности исполнительной власти разделены между Верховным руководителем и Президентом. Совет стражей конституции и Меджлис также выполняют схожие обязанности в качестве законодательных органов. В свою очередь, вооруженные силы разделены на регулярную армию и Корпус стражей исламской революции, а в судебной системе действует специальный суд, который рассматривает дела, заведенные на представителей иранского духовенства (Специальный суд по делам духовенства или Dadgah-e Vizhe Royhaniyoun). (Kamrava & Хассан-Яри, 2004)

Таким образом, политическую организацию Ирана следует понимать в контексте наличия гибридной политической системы, объединяющей элементы демократической и авторитарной систем. (Gilsin, 2016 г.) Нужно признать, что парламентские и президентские выборы стали неотъемлемой частью иранского политического ландшафта. Более того, выборы являются самым непредсказуемым явлением



Nearly 34 out of 55 million people eligible to vote, or approximately 62% of the electorate, turned out to vote. The Guardian Council approved 6,300 out of 12,123 candidates including 586 women and allowed to stand for election for the Majlis. Despite the fact that moderate candidates were largely barred from running, namely, the Guardian Council cut their number from 2000 to 200, representatives of the moderate camp could manage to gain the majority of seats in Tehran, which sends 30 representatives to the Majlis. Besides, as most of prominent pro-reform candidates have been disqualified, the main pro-reform parties have agreed on a joint list of candidates, the "Alliance of Reformists and Government Supporters" (Reuters, 2016), better known as the "Hope List", which also included women and young candidates.

Close cooperation between centrists and reformists during the election period should be considered as one of the main trends that began with the 2013 Iranian presidential elections. Reformists last rose to power in 1997 with the election of President Mohammad

в иранской политической системе. К примеру, последние двойные выборы в Меджлис и Совет экспертов, состоявшиеся 26 февраля 2016 г., продемонстрировали наличие плотной борьбы между соперничающими кандидатами. На самом деле, выборный процесс в Иране имеет свою уникальную отличительную особенность. Так, к примеру, несмотря на то, что по данным МВД Ирана, в стране зарегистрировано более 250 политических партий, они не обладают собственными политическими платформами, а также постоянным списком членов. На самом деле, отсутствует также и прямая связь между существующими партиями и их электоратом. (Разави, 2010)

Таким образом, отсутствие сильных политических партий в Иране затрудняет понимание того, как на самом деле организована политическая деятельность, а также какова политическая ориентация того или иного иранского политика. Так как политическая обстановка в стране не способствует созданию традиционных политических партий, политическая фракционность стала доминирующим элементом политической системы Ирана послереволюционной эпохи. (Алем, 2011)

Типичной формой политической организации в Иране является постоянно изменяющиеся альянсы политических групп и весомых политических фигур, ключевых социально-экономических сообществ и центров силы. (Меджлис монитор, 2016) В целях упрощения понимания политической ситуации в стране все ответственные за разработку политических решений можно условно разделить на 2 больших лагеря, а именно, на умеренных и консерваторов лагерей.

Коалиция реформистов, центристов или прагматических консерваторов вместе образуют лагерь умеренных, который более остальных готовы противостоять жесткому курсу, проводимому консерваторами. (The Guardian, 2016) Альянс состоит из членов десятков партий, в том числе Народная партия союза исламского Ирана, Недае Иран, Ирано-исламская партия свободы, Ассоциация борющихся клериков, Исламская партия труда и умеренности, Партии развития и т.д. Кроме того, центристы, находящиеся в середине

Khatami and secured a majority in parliament three years later. However, the balance of power was shifted back toward hardliners, who dominated the Iranian politics from 2004 until Rouhani's election nearly three years ago. (Dareini, 2016)

Actually, despite the fact that there was a list of representatives of moderate camp it was still difficult to calculate the number of seats gained by representatives of the Hope and Principalists lists. According to the Majlis Monitor, in the parliamentary elections, the Hope List performed the best with 80 out of 290 seats or 27.5%, followed by the Principalists List with 64 seats or 22%, independents with 73 seats or 25.1%, and religious minorities with 1.7%. A total of 69 seats or 23.7% remain to be determined in a second round of runoff elections in April 2016. (Majlis Monitor, 2016)

However, on the basis of the official report of the Interior Ministry of Iran (Information Center of the Interior Ministry of Iran, 2016) the Iranian Students News Agency claimed that moderates and hardliners had gained 83 and 75 seats in the parliament respectively. (ISNA, 2016) Moreover, the Iranian News Agency Entekhab stated that moderates had won the election gaining 83 seats in the parliament while hardliners and independent candidates had taken only 78 and 60 seats respectively. (Entekhab, 2016) The news agency Asriran provides similar information on the parliamentary elections results. (Asriran, 2016)

The inconsistencies concerning the Iranian elections results are mainly due to differences in approaches taken to identify political affiliation of the candidates.

Therefore, analyzing the parliamentary elections results it can be concluded, firstly, that there is continued uncertainty regarding the balance of power in the Parliament at least until the second



Iran's politics should be understood in the context of hybrid political system combining elements from both democratic and authoritarian systems.

Политическую организацию Ирана следует понимать в контексте наличия гибридной политической системы, объединяющей элементы демократической и авторитарной систем.



политического спектра Ирана, к которых, в первую очередь следует относить Спикера парламента Али Лариджани, также заявили о своем намерении присоединиться к лагерю умеренных для борьбы на выборах. Очевидно, что основной целью совместной деятельности на выборах являются сведение к минимуму потери голосов и максимальное увеличение шансов на победу.

В отличие от умеренных к лагерю консерваторов относятся сторонники аятоллы Али Хаменеи, поддерживающие исламские общественные ценности и рыночную экономику, влиятельные священнослужители, элита Стражей исламской революции и влиятельные предприниматели. Коалиция включает в себя различные политические партии, такие как Ревнителі Исламской революции, Фронт стабильности исламской революции, Исламская коалиционная партия и Ассоциация борющегося духовенства. (Reuters, 2016)

Тем не менее, такое разделение политической аффилированности парламентариев является весьма условным. Например, в крупных городах, как Тегеран, политики могут в одних вопросах являться сторонниками реформ, и в то же время, в отношении других придерживаться консервативной позиции. Поэтому, для Ирана вполне нормально, если парламентарии тесно сотрудничают как с консерваторами, так и с умеренными.

Возвращаясь к результатам выборов в Меджлис, следует отметить, что по их итогам значительно увеличилось количество парламентариев, представляющих умеренный лагерь. Следовательно, в обновленном Меджлисе Президент Хасан Роухани, который общепризнанно является умеренным политиком, будет пользоваться поддержкой парламентариев, одобряющих

round of elections, which are planned to be held in April. As we have already mentioned the runoff elections will decide the allocation of the remaining 69 seats. Therefore, there is still a chance for both camps to succeed in getting the majority of seats in the Majlis, especially, in case if they could form a short-term coalition with the parliamentarians who identify themselves as independent candidates. As a result, the possibility of either a Hope or Principalist list majority in the Parliament remains open.

Secondly, hardliners have been significantly weakened by the loss of key leaders and figures in Tehran. Despite the fact that hardliners camp managed their strong showing outside the capital the parliamentary result in Tehran will allow the President Hassan Rouhani and other moderates to significantly strengthen their position and to make the legislature somewhat more politically diverse. It is obvious that elected reformists will be an asset for Rouhani to pursue his domestic agenda, including social and economic reforms. (Dareini, 2016)

Finally, despite the fact that reformists and moderates, who widely support ideas of deepening the dialogue with the West and of implementing the policy of openness, partially restored their authorities in the Majlis, we should not expect that they will provide fundamental changes and drastic transformation of the Iranian society. Actually, all pro-reformist candidates approved by the Guardian Council have been proving their loyalty to the ideals of the Islamic Revolution.



All pro-reformist candidates approved by the Guardian Council have been proving their loyalty to the ideals of the Islamic Revolution.

Все без исключения прореформистские кандидаты, утвержденные Советом стражей конституции, доказали свою верность идеалам Исламской революции.



заключение соглашения по ядерной программе с западными державами и поддерживающих проведение политики открытости, по крайней мере, в сфере экономики, по отношению к странам мирового сообщества. (Gilsin, 2016)

Порядка 34 млн. избирателей из 55 млн. имеющих право голоса, или около 62% избирателей, приняли участия в голосовании. Из 12,123 кандидатов Совет стражей конституции утвердил 6,300 кандидатов, в том числе 586 женщин, которым было позволено баллотироваться на выборах в Меджлис. Несмотря на то, что количество кандидатов, представляющих лагерь умеренных, было в значительной степени сокращено, а именно, Совет стражей конституции сократил их число с 2,000 до 200 человек, представителям умеренного лагеря удавалось получить большинство мест в Тегеране, который посылает 30 представителей в Меджлис. Так как большая часть кандидатов, сторонников реформ не была допущена до выборов, главные прореформистские партии договорились о создании совместного списка кандидатов – «Альянс реформистов и сторонников правительства» (Reuters, 2016 г.), более известный как «Список надежды».

Тесное сотрудничество между центристами и реформаторами в предвыборный период следует рассматривать в качестве одной из основных тенденций, которая берет свое начало с иранских президентских

Iranian Agencies	ISNA	ASRIRAN	Entekhab	Majlis Monitor
Hope List	83	83	83	80
Hardliners	75	78	78	64
Independents	58	60	60	73
Minorities	5	5	5	5
Runoff	69	64	64	69
Total	290			

Figure 2. Majlis elections results

выборов 2013 г. Последний раз реформаторы оказывались у власти в 1997 г. с избранием Президента Мохаммада Хатами, а 3 года спустя закрепили свое большинство в парламенте. Тем не менее, баланс сил вновь сместился в сторону консерваторов, которые доминировали в иранской политике с 2004 г. и до того момента, когда три года назад Роухани был избран Президентом. (Dareini, 2016 г.)

Нужно отметить, что несмотря на наличие списков представителей умеренных, трудности с подсчетом парламентских мест, занятых представителями двух лагерей, все же возникли. По данным агентства Majlis Monitor, на парламентских выборах, кандидаты «Списка надежды» получила 80 из 290 мест в Парламенте или 27,5%, за ними следует представители списка консерваторов - 64 места или 22%, независимые кандидаты получили 73 места или 25,1%, и религиозные меньшинства – 5 мест или 1,7%. В общей сложности 69 мест или 23,7% будут определены во втором туре выборов, запланированных на апрель 2016 (Меджлис монитор, 2016)

Тем не менее, на основании официального отчета МВД Ирана, иранское информационное агентство ISNA обозначило, что умеренные и консерваторы получили 83 и 75 мест в Парламенте соответственно. (ЕНД, 2016) в свою очередь, иранское информационное агентство Entekhab заявило, что умеренные победили на выборах, заняв 83 места в Парламенте, в то время как консерваторы и независимые кандидаты заняли только 78 и 60 мест соответственно. (Entekhab, 2016 г.) Информационное агентство Asriran предоставляет аналогичную информацию о результатах парламентских выборов. (Asriran, 2016 г.)

Противоречия относительно результатов выборов в Иране, возникают, в основном, из-за различий в подходах к определению политической аффилированности кандидатов.

Исходя из этого, анализируя результаты парламентских выборов, можно сделать следующие выводы, во-первых, сохраняется неопределенность в отношении баланса сил в Парламенте по крайней мере до завершения второго тура голосования, который планируется провести в апреле. Как уже отмечалось, выборы



www.img.tyt.by

определят кандидатов на оставшиеся 69 места в Парламенте. Таким образом, еще есть шанс, что одному из двух лагерей удастся получить большинство мест в Меджлисе, в особенности, если они смогли бы сформировать краткосрочную коалицию с парламентариями, которые идентифицируют себя в качестве независимых кандидатов. В результате, вопрос о доминировании умеренных или консерваторов в Парламенте остается открытым.

Во-вторых, сторонники консервативной линии были значительно ослаблены поражением



на выборах в Тегеране. Несмотря на тот факт, что консерваторам удалось показать хорошие результаты на выборах за пределами столицы, результат парламентских выборов в Тегеране позволит Президенту Роухани и другим умеренным политикам значительно укрепить свои позиции, диверсифицировав власть в законодательном органе. Вполне очевидно, что избранные реформаторы выступят в поддержку реализуемой Роухани внутренней повестки, в том числе и в отношении социально-экономических реформ. (Dareini, 2016 г.)

Наконец, несмотря на то, что реформаторы и умеренные консерваторы, широко поддерживающие расширение диалога с Западом и реализацию политики открытости, частично восстановили свои полномочия в Меджлисе, не следует ожидать, что они смогут обеспечить фундаментальные изменения и радикальные преобразования иранского общества, поскольку все без исключения прореформистские кандидаты, утвержденные Советом стражей конституции, доказали свою верность идеалам Исламской революции.



CHINESE VIEW ON THE EXPANSION OF THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

Dr. Azhar Serikkaliyeva

КИТАЙСКОЕ ВИДЕНИЕ РАСШИРЕНИЯ ШАНХАЙСКОЙ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВА

Founded in 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) now has China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as its full members, with Afghanistan, Belarus, India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan as observers, and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Turkey as dialogue partners. The official founding declaration asserted that the main objective of the organization was to combat the so-called three evil forces: international terrorism, ethnic separatism and religious extremism. The organization has been interpreted in a variety of ways since its inception. One group of analysts agree with the views of the governments of the SCO member states that the organization is primarily focused on internal security problems in the region. Most Chinese analysts express the same view that the SCO is a regional organization of non-

Сегодня основанная в 2001 году Шанхайской организации сотрудничества (ШОС) состоит из Китая, Казахстана, Кыргызстана, России, Таджикистана и Узбекистана в качестве полноправных членов организации, а также Афганистана, Беларуси, Индии, Ирана, Монголии и Пакистана в качестве обозревателей, также Армении, Азербайджана, Камбоджи, Непала, Шри Ланки и Турции в качестве партнеров по диалогу. Официальная декларация утверждает, что главная цель организации борьба с так называемыми «тремя злами»: международным терроризмом, этническим сепаратизмом и религиозным экстремизмом. Организация была интерпретирована в различных формах момента ее создания. Одна группа аналитиков согласна с мнением правительств государств-членов ШОС, что организация в первую очередь сосредоточена на внутренних проблемах безопасности в регионе. Большинство китайских

traditional security. Western interpretations are quite different, as they argue that the SCO constituted a joint effort by a group of authoritarian states to defend themselves against regime change in the face of a regional democratic trend.

Most analysts agree that this regional organization is largely a Chinese initiative and that China plays a leading role in the SCO process. Some analysts suggest that China attempted to enter and to manage this region via a multilateral approach. China is using the SCO for implementation of the "Beijing Consensus" in Central Asia. Since the political values and foreign policy are one of the three sources of the Chinese soft power, the SCO has gradually become the main mechanism or guide for China's policy in Central Asia. Along with the Central Asian countries the organization includes Russia, which allows to significantly mitigate the perception of China in the Central Asian region as a threat. Also, the SCO provides a good framework

аналитиков выражают ту же точку зрения, что ШОС является региональной организацией нетрадиционной безопасности. Интерпретации западных ученых значительно отличаются, они утверждают, что ШОС является совместным усилием группы авторитарных государств, защищающихся от смены режима в сторону регионального демократического направления.

Большинство аналитиков сходятся во мнении, что эта региональная организация в значительной степени является китайской инициативой и ,что Китай играет ведущую роль в «шосовском» процессе. Некоторые аналитики предполагают, что Китай пытается войти в регион и управлять им с помощью многостороннего подхода. Китай использует ШОС для реализации «пекинского консенсуса» в Центральной Азии. Поскольку политические ценности и внешняя политика являются одним из трех источников китайской мягкой силы, ШОС постепенно становится основным механизмом или руководством для китайской политики в Центральной Азии. Наряду со странами Центральной Азии в организацию входит и Россия, которая позволяет значительно смягчить



for China to cooperate closely in combating terrorism, extremism, separatism and various other cross-border criminal forces. The primary target of the Chinese anti-terrorism campaign is the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which advocates for the independence of Xinjiang. From the Chinese perspective, in the framework of the SCO it is of particular importance for China to be able to count on the support of the other nine member and observer states in its campaign against the ETIM. Moreover, China has also been able to draw support from the SCO partners in its efforts to frustrate other conventional or non-conventional security threats and to eliminate or to ease the external factors of disruption to China's stability and development.

China employs the SCO as a vehicle to expand its influence in its immediate neighborhood where it does not have any solid historical and cultural foundation, as opposed to Russia, which long had Central Asia as a part of Tsarist Russia and later as a part of the Soviet Union for about 200 years. Therefore, China was not generally interested in inviting new members to join the organization because it was more concerned with consolidating cooperation with the existing members, particularly the Central Asian states. Beijing was equally interested in the development of security aspect as well as economic ties. China held great hopes for the ability of the SCO to organize multilateral economic cooperation. Beijing wanted to use the SCO in order to export its products, labor and capital to the neighboring countries. For this purpose China offered a variety of projects: from an introduction of a free trade zone to the establishment



Most analysts agree that Shanghai Cooperation Organization is largely Chinese initiative and that China plays a leading role in the SCO process.

Китай, как инициатор создания ШОС, имел большие надежды на способность организации превратиться в механизм многостороннего экономического сотрудничества.



восприятие Китая в качестве угрозы в Центрально-азиатском регионе. Кроме того, ШОС обеспечивает хорошую основу для тесного сотрудничества Китая с остальными странами в борьбе с терроризмом, экстремизмом, сепаратизмом и различными другими трансграничными преступными силами. Основной целью китайской антитеррористической кампании является Исламское движение Восточного Туркестана (ИДВТ), которое выступает за независимость Синьцзяна. С китайской точки зрения, возможность рассчитывать на поддержку своей кампании против ИДВТ других девяти государств-членов и наблюдателей ШОС имеет особое значение. Кроме того, Китай также в состоянии привлечь поддержку со стороны партнеров по ШОС в его усилиях по уничтожению других угроз общей или нетрадиционной безопасности, и тем самым устранить или ослабить внешние факторы, нарушающие стабильность и развитие Китая.

Китай использует ШОС в качестве механизма расширения своего влияния в непосредственной близости, где он не имеет прочной исторической и культурной основы, в отличие от России, в состав которой Центральную Азию входила в период царской России, а позже в составе Советского Союза в течение приблизительно 200 лет. Таким образом, Китай в целом не заинтересован в привлечении новых членов в организацию, поскольку он был больше озабочен укреплением сотрудничества с существующими членами, в частности, государствами Центральной Азии. Пекин был в равной степени заинтересован в развитии как аспекта безопасности, так и экономических связей. Китай возлагал большие надежды на способность ШОС стать организацией многостороннего экономического сотрудничества. Пекин намеревался использовать ШОС для того, чтобы экспортировать свою продукцию, трудовые ресурсы и капитал в соседние страны. Для этого



www.tengrinews.kz

of the SCO Development Bank. However, all these initiatives were blocked by the other members of the organization. When commenting on the Regulations on Observer States of the SCO in June 2004 Secretary General of the SCO, Zhang Deguang, stated that the priority for the SCO was not enlargement but more substantial international cooperation and development. As summarized by S. Kushkumbayev, unless clear parameters of the economic interaction within the framework of the SCO are established, Beijing would not be interested in expanding the SCO membership to include the states of South-East Asia.

Beijing has offered a number of programs on investments into the SCO states from the assets of the organization on a bilateral basis. Other economic projects were not carried out within the framework of the SCO. The crisis of 2014, and the sanctions



China had great hopes on the ability of the SCO to organize multilateral economic cooperation.

Пекин предложил целый ряд программ по инвестированию в государства-члены ШОС, однако экономические проекты не были осуществлены в рамках организации.



Китай предложил целый ряд проектов: от введения зоны свободной торговли до создания Банка развития ШОС. Тем не менее, все эти инициативы были заблокированы другими членами организации. Комментируя Положение о государствах-наблюдателях ШОС в июне 2004 года Генеральный секретарь ШОС Чжан Дэгуан заявил, что приоритетом для ШОС является не расширение, а более значительное международное сотрудничество и развитие. По мнению С. Кушкумбаева, пока четкие параметры экономического взаимодействия в рамках ШОС не будут установлены, Пекин не будет заинтересован в расширении членства в ШОС для включения государств Юго-Восточной Азии.

Пекин предложил ряд программ по инвестированию в государства ШОС, однако осуществлялись они на двусторонней основе. Другие экономические проекты не были осуществлены в рамках ШОС. Кризис 2014 года, а также санкции против России нанесли значительный ущерб

against Russia considerably damaged the economic situation in Russia and the entire Central Asian region prompting the need for investments. In this light, China immediately suggested the establishment of the Silk Road Fund. All these factors have a positive impact on the fact that China, relying on the SCO as a base platform, put forward a new initiative, the creation of the "New Silk Road Economic Belt" and the "21st century Marine Silk Road" in 2013. At the moment, the initiative is called "One Belt, One Road". Consequently, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), a regional organization, initially created with the aim to protect itself from excessive economic influence of China, has changed its direction toward the interface with the Chinese initiative.

The establishment of the "New Silk Road Economic Belt" has solved an issue of the future enlargement of the SCO membership. Based on Russia's proposal, the SCO leaders passed a resolution on starting the procedures of granting India and Pakistan full membership of the organization at the 15th SCO summit in Ufa, Russia in 2015. Pakistan applied for a full membership in 2006 and India in 2014. There are enough reasons explaining Pakistan's enthusiasm to become an SCO member. It has strong political, economic and security motivations. Foreseeing that the SCO membership may further strengthen its ties with China, a longstanding 'all weather' ally is equally important. On the other hand, China is happy to see its ally as part of the organization. It understands that the admission of Pakistan alone is unacceptable to Russia. Analysts believe that India's bid to join the SCO is supported by Russia, as Russian

экономической ситуации в России и во всем Центрально-азиатском регионе, что побудило еще большую потребность в инвестициях. В этом свете, Китай незамедлительно предложил создать Фонд Шелкового пути. Все эти факторы оказывают положительное влияние на то, что Китай, опираясь на ШОС в качестве базовой платформы, в 2013 году выдвинул новую инициативу, создание «Экономического пояса нового Шелкового пути» и «Морского Шелкового пути 21-го века». На данный момент эта инициатива называется «Один пояс - один путь». Следовательно, Евразийский экономический союз (ЕврАзЭС), региональная организация, изначально созданная с целью защититься от чрезмерного экономического влияния Китая, изменила свое направление в сторону сопряжения с китайской инициативой.

Создание «Экономического пояса нового Шелкового пути» решило вопрос о будущем расширении членства в ШОС. На основании предложения России, лидеры ШОС приняли резолюцию о начале процедуры предоставления Индии и Пакистана полноправного членства в организации на 15-м саммите ШОС в России в городе Уфе в 2015 году. Пакистан подал заявку на полное членство в 2006 году и Индия в 2014 году. Существует достаточно причин, объясняющих желание

Пакистана стать членом ШОС. Он имеет сильные политические, экономические и безопасности мотивации.

Предвидя, что членство в ШОС может способствовать дальнейшему укреплению связей с Китаем, одинаково важно оставаться союзником в «любую погоду». С одной стороны, Китай рад видеть своего союзника в рамках этой организации. С другой стороны он понимает, что прием только Пакистана неприемлем для России. Аналитики считают, что заявка Индии на присоединение к ШОС поддержана Россией, по мнению российских



policy makers believe that it would be easier to constrain China's influence on the SCO with India as a full member. As for China, it had no reason to welcome a potential competitor into an organization where it played a leading role until the admission of Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan were admitted to the SCO inciting rivalry within the organization.

The stance reflected in two documents relating the procedure of admitting new members mainly represents a passive Chinese response to the enthusiastic membership requests expressed by some states. It, by no means, implies that the SCO members have a specific enlargement plan in mind, let alone a consensus. A combination of new members and a determination to make the organization a genuinely important and influential bloc is likely to ensure that the further development and expansion of the SCO. The ambition to create a truly dominant organization free of any Western influence may become a reality in the near future. It is quite easy to set up formal multilateral organization. However, whether this organization can or cannot have a real effect on international relations is another matter. In this institutional dimension, China has more freedom to play, since its partners do not treat the issue as a priority. Russia and the Central Asian states understand the utility that the SCO provides to them. This multilateral institution is also helping China and Russia to regulate their interactions in Central Asia. China will not give up its attempt to play the leading role because it has huge stakes riding on it, including its international reputation and credibility.



Beijing offered a number of programs to invest into the SCO states, but economic projects were not carried out in the SCO framework. In 2013 China put forward a new initiative — “One Belt, One Road”. After solving multilateral economic cooperation question, China turned attention to the future of the SCO’s membership enlargement.

После решения вопроса многостороннего экономического сотрудничества путем выдвижения в 2013 году инициативы «Один пояс – один путь», Китай обратил внимание на вопрос о будущем расширении членства ШОС.




политиков, сдерживать влияние Китая на ШОС будет легче с Индией в качестве полноправного члена. Что касается Китая, то у него не было никаких оснований, чтобы приветствовать потенциального конкурента в организации, где он играет ведущую роль до вступления Пакистана. И Индия, и Пакистан были допущены в ШОС в результате разрастания конкуренции в рамках организации.

Позиция отраженная в двух документах, касающихся процедуры приема новых членов, в основном представляет собой пассивный китайский ответ на запросы на вступление, выраженные некоторыми государствами. Из этого, отнюдь не следует, что члены ШОС имеют конкретный план расширения, не говоря уже о консенсусе. Сочетание новых членов и решимости сделать организацию подлинно важным и влиятельным институтом, скорее всего для того, чтобы обеспечить дальнейшее развитие и расширение ШОС. Стремление создать действительно доминирующую организацию, свободную от любого западного влияния может стать реальностью в ближайшем будущем. Довольно легко создать формальную многостороннюю организацию. Однако, в состоянии ли эта организация оказать реальное воздействие на международные отношения - это другое дело. В этом институциональном аспекте, Китай имеет больше свободы для маневра, так как его партнеры не рассматривают вопрос в качестве приоритета. Россия и государства Центральной Азии осознают всю полезность, которую им предоставляет ШОС. Этот многосторонний институт также оказывает содействие Китаю и России для регулирования их взаимодействия в Центральной Азии. Китай не откажется от своей попытки играть ведущую роль, поскольку он делает огромные ставки ведя организацию, включая международную репутацию и доверие.

ПРОТИВОСТОЯНИЕ МЕЖДУ СУННИТАМИ И ШИИТАМИ НА БЛИЖНЕМ ВОСТОКЕ УСИЛИВАЕТСЯ

Dr. Erkin Baydarov



Кризис в Сирии и противостояние всех заинтересованных сил в разрешении конфликта на Ближнем Востоке добавляет все новые и новые проблемы. Одним из таких «проблем», которая несомненно добавит новых дров в разгорающийся огонь этнических и религиозных противоречий в регионе, стали итоги завершившейся в пятницу 12 марта 2016 года в Каире

145-й сессии Совета Лиги арабских государств (ЛАГ) на уровне министров иностранных дел, где ливанская шиитская группировка «Хезболлах» была признана террористической организацией.

«За» проголосовало большинство членов Лиги, Ирак и Ливан воздержались. Алжир, попросил пометить в протоколе, что

возражает против некоторых пунктов решения. Чуть ранее, 2 марта 2016 года террористической организацией «Хезболлах» признал Совет сотрудничества арабских государств Персидского залива (ССАГПЗ), в который входят Саудовская Аравия, Катар, Кувейт, Бахрейн, Оман и ОАЭ.

Единственным, кто с трибуны ЛАГ выступил в защиту шиитских формирований, стал глава МИД Ирака Ибрагим аль-Джаафари, чем вызвал гнев саудовской делегации, покинувшей зал заседания и вернувшейся лишь после того, как иракский дипломат закончил свое выступление. (именно иракский)

«Хезболла́» (араб. حزب الله «партия Аллаха», 1982), ведущая в настоящее время наряду с иранскими бойцами из Корпуса Стражей Исламской революции боевые действия против группировки «Исламское государство» (ДАИШ) в Ираке и Сирии на стороне правительственных войск, пользуется финансовой и военной поддержкой Ирана и Сирии. Еще в мае 2013 года, Салман Шейх, глава «Brookings Doha Center», выступая на Мировом экономическом Форуме в Иордании заявил, что «на стороне Асада в Сирии сейчас воюют 5 тысяч боевиков «Хезболла», и ещё 5 тысяч готовы к ним присоединиться».

Если во многих странах мира (Канада, США, Израиль, Египет, Австралии, Великобритания и частично в странах ЕС) «Хезболлах» признана террористической организацией, то в России «Хезболлах» не



Усилившиеся террористические атаки на Турцию свидетельствуют, что борьба с международным терроризмом, под какую бы благую идею она не пряталась, должна вестись со стороны всего мирового сообщества.



считается террористической организацией. Москва считает, что «Хезболлах» является законной общественно-политической силой, имеющей представителей в парламенте Ливана. Позиция России, втянувшейся в сирийский конфликт указывает на совпадение ее интересов с интересами Ирана – Сирии – «Хезболлы», цель которых помочь своему союзнику президенту Сирии Башару аль-Асаду победить в гражданской войне.

Признание «Хезболлах» террористической организацией со стороны ЛАГ естественно найдет поддержку как со стороны ливанских, египетских и др. салафитских организаций на Ближнем Востоке, так и со стороны сражающихся против официального Дамаска, Ирана и «Хезболлы» на стороне «Свободной Сирийской армии», в союзе с «Джебхат-ан-Нусра», «Исламским государством» прочих оппозиционных вооруженных группировок.

Усилившиеся террористические атаки на Турцию свидетельствуют о том, что борьба с международным терроризмом, под какую бы благую идею она не пряталась, должна вестись со стороны всего мирового сообщества. В связи с этим, итоги 145-й сессии Совета Лиги арабских государств ЛАГ на уровне министров иностранных дел в Каире, можно оценивать положительно. С другой стороны, военное противостояние суннитских и шиитских военных группировок на Ближнем Востоке, делает мирное разрешение сирийского кризиса все более и более проблематичным.

MODERNIZATION OF THE ENERGY SYSTEM IN SOUTH KAZAKHSTAN REGION IS PRIORITY!

Farkhod Aminjonov

The government will allocate 34.542 billion Tenge for the program to increase energy efficiency of the energy systems in the South Kazakhstan Region. Along with money savings for the customers and reducing the volume of wasted energy supplies for the companies that the modernization measures are expected to bring, improved energy efficiency will have a strategic significance.

The program is scheduled for 2016-2022. Over the course of this period, the direct output from the program might reach over 600 million Tenge

in savings. Moreover, it will also (a) decrease the number of accidents and emergencies along the energy supply chain, (b) improve reliability and quality of energy supplies, (c) reduce technical losses for 18 million kWh, (d) connect new customers to the central grid, (e) increase the transmission volume for 81 MWh annually and (f) supply capacities for 133.6 MW. Under this particular modernization program, priority will be given to "Tsementnaya" substation the technical losses of electricity supply of which are



www.dentons.com

extremely high. The second object, with high power inefficiency indicators that the program would give a priority, is the "L-Akzhar" high voltage transmission line with the total length of 18.6 km. Currently, 76 percent of the system is outdated. This very same line is considered to be a power supply infrastructure to a number of important facilities in Shymkent city, including Shymkent telecommunication center, and hospitals in Akzhar and Aktas



Along with money savings for the customers and reducing the volume of wasted energy supplies for the companies, improved energy efficiency will have a strategic significance.



Ability to save some energy through energy efficiency initiatives is an important tool to decrease Kazakhstan's dependence on the southern neighbors.



villages. The authorities are planning to almost entirely replace the transmission line network. Next in the line are "Zalineynaya," "Smasonovka," and "Sovetskaya" substations.

Modernization of the energy supply facilities in the Southern regions of the country is important for three main reasons:

1) Power supply to the Southern regions of Kazakhstan still relies to some extent on import of electricity from Kazakhstan's southern neighbors – Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbek authorities' inability to meet the peak power demand in Uzbekistan and technical problems on power producing facilities in Kyrgyzstan sometimes result in unexpected electricity supplies to the Southern Kazakhstan. Ability to save some energy through energy efficiency initiatives is an important tool to decrease Kazakhstan's dependence on the southern neighbors.

2) Starting from July 1, 2015 tariffs for electricity was increased in the South Kazakhstan Region. While the tariffs per generation capacity remained the same, tariffs for additional expenditures to increase the production itself that depend on the changing cost of introducing new technologies, attracting qualified personnel and etc. now will be covered by the customers. Thus, energy efficiency initiatives will be important complementary factors to reduce the burden on the electricity customers in the region.

3) There is a considerable disparity between region's power production and consumption capacities. Taking into account growing local demand the situation the gap will less likely be reduced any time soon. The South Kazakhstan Region is currently consuming around 4 billion kWh per year, while the production rate is about 1.2 billion kWh per year.

In this regard, energy efficiency initiatives in the Southern parts of Kazakhstan will not only have an economic effect on the consumers' wellbeing, but also strategic significance for the region.



THE MEETING OF THE STATE BORDER SERVICE HEADS OF THE CASPIAN SEA STATES

www.wikimedia.org

Lidiya Parkhomchik

During the meeting in Baku held on March 11, 2016, the State Border Service heads of Azerbaijan, Russia and Iran discussed security issues in the Caspian Sea. The delegations led by Chief of the State Border Service of Azerbaijan, Colonel General Elchin Guliyev, Deputy Director of the Russian Federation's Federal Security Service, Head of the Border Service, Vladimir Kulishov, and Border Guard Commander of Iran, Qasem Rezaee, exchanged views on the issue of ensuring border security, combating smuggling, illegal migration and illegal fishing.

It was stressed that there is a strong necessity to launch first joint border services exercises and to continue the practice of holding mutual friendship

“

During the meeting in Baku held on March 11, 2016, the State Border Service heads of Azerbaijan, Russia and Iran discussed security issues in the Caspian Sea.

”

visits of the border guard ships to the Caspian Sea ports. For instance, the mutual visits of Iran's and Russia's border guard ships have become common practice in the last three years after the Iranians first visited the Russian Caspian fleet in Summer, 2013. It should be mentioned that last time three Iranian warships, namely, two missile boats, Paykan and Joshan, and the Damavand destroyer, arrived at the Russian port of Astrakhan for a visit to Russia's Caspian Sea base in October 2015. After docking in Astrakhan the vessels headed to Baku, and then returned home to the Iranian Bandar-e Anzali port within two weeks.

It also should be emphasized that the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, had talks with both Russian and

Iranian heads of border services' delegations. In both cases, the parties focused their attention on improving cooperation and joint activity of the border services of the countries, especially, on issue of struggling against criminal elements, smugglers, terrorists and illegal drug traffickers.

However, despite the fact that during the state border service heads meetings the mutual activity between parties was hailed as constructive, there is still a great need for improving coordinated operational and preventive security measures as part of the mutual border cooperation in the Caspian

Sea. For instance, there is a growing need to put the Agreement on security cooperation in the Caspian Sea into operation and finally finish the preparatory process for launching Additional Protocol to this Agreement.

The State Border Service Heads of the Caspian Sea States stressed that there is a strong necessity to launch first joint border services exercises and to continue the practice of holding mutual friendship visits of the border guard ships to the Caspian Sea ports.

TURKEY TO BOOST ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP WITH KAZAKHSTAN

Akbota Akylbayeva



The new transportation line would be used as a passage for Kazakhstan to enter the European landscape through Turkey



On March 13, 2016, Ankara hosted the 9th Joint Economic Commission between Kazakhstan and Turkey. At the Intergovernmental Commission Kazakhstan's Investments and Development Minister Asset Issekeshov and Turkish Economy

Minister Mustafa Elitas discussed on future bilateral cooperation in terms of the Middle Corridor project. During the press conference on March 12, 2016, the Turkish Minister of Economy, Mustafa Elitas stated that through

the Middle Corridor initiative, Turkey has proposed a new impetus of transportation network that is to pass through the Caspian Sea, Turkey and Azerbaijan and directly lead to Central Asian region and China. Such an initiative for a revival of Turkish version of the modern Silk Road is a great opportunity for the regional economy and agriculture trade, as it may act as a saving belt during the stagnation period.

The Minister also stated that despite economic challenges in the last years and political deadlock with Russia, Turkish economy grew by 5.1 percent during the period of 2010-2016. The main initiative behind the project of Turkey's Middle Corridor lies in the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad, which is planned to be constructed in 2016. Moreover, the new transportation line would be used as a passage for Kazakhstan to enter the European landscape through Turkey. The Middle Corridor will connect the Aktau port located at the shores of Caspian Sea



Conducting bilateral trade through the constructed pathway, would not only boost ties of two states, but also benefit their domestic economies.



with the railroad that would pathway to China. Elitas, also noted that Turkish domestic companies as the part of the partnership agreements, are ready to offer sustenance to Kazakhstan's economy, through intensifying trade and large scale activity at the Caspian port of Aktau.

Conducting bilateral trade through the constructed pathway, would not only boost ties of two states, but also benefit their domestic economies. Notwithstanding the fact that the Middle Corridor initiative may confront with the interest of Chinese the Silk Road Economic Belt, Turkey and China has already signed a number of agreements that include the memorandum of understanding between the parties.

It is stated that the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev is planning to make an official visit to Turkey in April 2016, in order to finalize the deals and sign the New Strategy Partnership Economic Program for 2016-2020 period.

MÜLTECİ KRİZİNE ÇARE: TÜRKİYE VE AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ARASINDA "BİRE BİR" ANLAŞMASI

Cengizhan Canaltay

Ayrıntıları kesin olmamakla beraber Türkiye ve AB'nin mültecileri seçerek alma veya gönderme hakkı bulunmayacaktır.

Altı ay süren pazarlıkların ardından, 7 Mart'ta ortaya çıkan Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği (AB) arasında "Bire Bir" formülüne dayanan göçmen krizi planı üzerinde prensip anlaşıldı. AB ülkeleri bu planı kendi aralarında tartışmaya açacak ve 18 Mart'ta eğer plan üzerinde nihai anlaşmaya varılır ise imzalar atılacak ve plan uygulamaya konulacaktır. Plan kısaca yürürlüğe girdikten sonra

Türkiye'den Yunanistan'a ulaşan tüm mülteciler Türkiye'ye geri gönderilecek ve Türkiye'ye geri gönderilen her bir mülteciye karşılık, Türkiye'deki mülteci kamplarında yaşayan bir Suriyelinin AB'ye gönderilmesi sağlanacaktır. Böylece hem göç akını bir düzene konulmuş olacak, ekonomik göçmenlerin (AB'nin ekonomik imkânları için diğer ülkelerden göç edenler) önü kesilerek sadece ihtiyacı olan mültecilere gerekli imkanın sağlanması mümkün olacaktır.

Müzakereler sürecinde Türkiye AB'den Türk vatandaşlarının Haziran 2016'dan itibaren Schengen bölgesinde vizeden muaf tutulmasını,



www.onedio.com

mülteciler için 3 milyar Avro yardımını Mart sonuna kadar gönderilmesini ve gerekirse ek fonlama isteğinin yanı sıra AB üyelik sürecinde yeni başlıkların görüşmelere açılmasını istedi. Karşılığında ise mülteci kabulü anlaşmasını imzalayacağını ve sınır güvenliğini artıracaklarını vaat etti. Müzakereler sürecinde Türkiye'nin masaya güçlü bir şekilde oturarak kozlarını iyi kullandığı yorumları yapılmaktadır ve buna örnek olarak ise ana taleplerinin AB tarafından kabul edilmesi gösterilmektedir.

Ayrıntıları kesin olmamakla beraber Türkiye ve AB'nin mültecileri seçerek alma veya gönderme hakkı bulunmayacaktır. Bu husus şu açıdan önemlidir: medya da çıkan bazı haberlerde AB'nin sadece eğitimli ve meslek sahibi ve Hristiyan Suriyelileri kabul edeceği söylentileri çıkmıştır. Bu noktada AB'nin sosyal ve ekonomik açıdan kendi şartlarına daha kolay uyum sağlayabilecek mültecileri tercih etmek gibi bir düşüncesi olabilir ancak üzerinde prensipte uzlaşmaya varılan bu anlaşmada Türkiye buna izin vermeyecektir.

Buna ek olarak AB'ye uyum sürecinde Hristiyan olan mülteciler daha hızlı adapte olabilir ama ekonomik açıdan bakıldığında bir Suriyeli öğretmenin veya avukatın Avrupa'da çalışması dil, kanunlar ve gerekli bilgi donanımı ve tecrübe farklılığı açısından



**Türkiye
AB'den Türk
vatandaşlarının
Haziran 2016'dan
itibaren
Schengen
bölgesinde
vizeden muaf
tutulmasını
istedi.**



öngörüldüğü kadar kolay olmayacaktır. Burada asıl vasıfsız işçilerin ekonomik entegrasyonu vasıflı işçilerden daha hızlı bir şekilde gerçekleştirilebileceği için ülke ekonomilerine kısa sürede katkı sağlayabilir. Öte yandan vasıfsız işçilerin AB'nin yaşanan iş gücüne de pozitif katkıları olacaktır.

"Bire Bir" formülü kâğıt üzerinde mülteci krizini bir düzene sokabilecek bir sistematığe sahip görünürken planın yürütmesine şüpheli bakanlar pratikte nasıl işleyeceğini ve Suriyeli olmayan göçmenler hakkında net bir planın olmayışını eleştirmektedir. Çünkü AB'nin Yunanistan'dan 66 bin 400 mülteciyi alıp birlik içinde dağıtacağı sözünü vermesine rağmen sadece 325 kişiyi almış olması Türkiye'ye verilen sözleri nasıl yerine getirileceğini sorgulamaktadır.

Öte yandan, bazı uzmanlar ve Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) gibi uluslararası örgütler anlaşmanın uluslararası hukuka aykırı düşebileceği konusunu gündeme getirmektedir. AB'nin yabancı ülke vatandaşlarını kitleler halinde sınır dışı etmesinin Avrupa İnsan Hakları Konvansiyonu'na aykırı olduğunu belirtilmektedir. 18 Mart 2016 tarihinde gerçekleştirilecek olan görüşmede ayrıntılar konuşulmaya devam edilecek ve anlaşmanın uygulamaya konulup konulmayacağı belirlenecektir.



www.bbc.com

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NORTH POLE RESEARCH STATION IN JEOPARDY

Saule Akhmetkaliyeva

“

According to Artur Chilingarov there is a chance that the North Pole research station would not be operational in 2016 due to insufficient funds.

”

According to Artur Chilingarov, Putin's former special envoy to the Arctic, there is a chance that the North Pole research station would not be operational in 2016 due to insufficient funds. The funds are usually provided by the Ministry of Natural Resources of Russia. Funds worth a total of 200 million rubles (\$2.8 million) are required to establish a drifting station. There is a helicopter flight scheduled for March 18, 2016 aimed at locating an ice island where a drifting station can be stationed.

The North Pole-1 station was first established in 1937 by Ivan Papanin. Since then the stations were operational continuously during the Soviet

era. The post-Soviet research was restarted in 2003. Research on the station is conducted in such fields as oceanography, ice studies, meteorology, aerology, geophysics, hydrochemistry, hydrophysics, and marine biology. The research is usually conducted in winter season starting from September-October.

The last Russian drifting station was the NorthPole-2015 with 20 researchers onboard. The drifting station was operational only for four month in the period from April to August 2015. The scientists mostly monitored environmental conditions in the Arctic and held variable scientific experiments in the

“

Research on the station is conducted in such fields as oceanography, ice studies, meteorology, aerology, geophysics, hydrochemistry, hydrophysics, and marine biology.

”

field of meteorology, aerology, oceanology, glaciology, hydro-chemistry, hydro-biology and magnetometric studies. According to the Minister of Natural Resources of Russia, Sergey Donskoy, valuable data on biodiversity and climate change was obtained as a result of the expedition. The previous drifting station, North Pole-40 was suspended in 2013 due to appearance of cracks on the ice floe. The crew of 16 people had to be evacuated from the station.

Due to increase of the aerial temperature in recent years, finding a solid ice island capable of supporting a whole station has become problematic. Therefore, in 2013 it was announced that a floating platform replacing ice floe is to be built. In this light, even a financing of 1.7 billion rubles was allocated, however, no further announcements regarding the project were made.

The North Pole-1 drifting station, 1937

IRANIAN OIL EXPORTS WILL HIT 2 MILLION BARRELS PER DAY IN COMING MONTHS

Daniyar Nurbayev




www.vox.com

According to the Iranian First Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri in the coming three months country's oil export will hit two million barrels per day (bpd). According to Jahangiri, after the sanctions were lifted on 17 January 2016, Iran was able to increase its export from 1 million bpd to 1.4 million bpd. Earlier, the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani predicted that Iran's oil export would hit two million bpd in August 2016. Last month Iran shipped 29 vessels some of which were sent to countries such as France, Spain and Russia. Moreover, they plan

to resumption their oil export to Holland, Italy and Greece. This fact may have a negative effect on oil prices.

In 20 March 2016, in Moscow will be held a meeting between oil producers to discuss a global pact on freezing oil production at January levels. Three OPEC members Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and Qatar and non-member Russia and Azerbaijan already agreed to freeze oil production if the pact will be enacted. The fact that Iran is going to increase its production may be a problem to adopt the oil pact. The



OECD, US EIA, author's calculation

World Excess supply, million BPD

main reason for this is that no country want to lose its market share. If in 20 March 2016, the OPEC countries agree to freeze their oil productions, then Iran's production share in OPEC's oil export will increase from 8.9% to 12% and Iranian export reach 2 million bpd.

Figure 1 shows that in 2015 world oil supply exceeded oil demand by 2 million bpd (supply 95 million bpd; demand 93 million bpd), and this amount is achieved without additional Iranian export. Thus, if Iran is able to



According to Jahangiri, Iran was able to increase its export from 1 million bpd to 1.4 million bpd.



increase its export up to 2 million bpd, then world supply will hit 96 million bpd in case if world exporters agreed to freeze world production without Iran. Because of weak economic situation in the world, OPEC expects in 2016 world oil demand will increase up to 94.2 million bpd, which means supply will exceed demand by 1.8 million bpd. That means even if oil producers are able to enact the oil pact, we cannot expect that in 2016 we will see a substantial increase in oil prices.


It is clear that for the oil producing countries it is very important to urge Iran to join to the oil pact. However, the pact is not beneficial for Iran and it is doubtful that Iran endorses the pact. In recent days, Iran is eager to reach its pre-sanctions oil production level (3.7 million bpd in 2010, 2.86 million bpd in 2015) when the country accounted for 12.5% of OPEC's oil production.

www.report.az



It is clear that for the oil producing countries it is very important to urge Iran to join to the oil pact.





VLADIMIR PUTIN DEFINED RUSSIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH ARMENIA AS A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

Aidana Arynbeek

On March 10, the President of Russia Vladimir Putin and the President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan met in Moscow, and discussed on the prospects for bilateral relationship between the countries, the integration in the Eurasian space, and the questions regarding Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement. Vladimir Putin defined the relationship between Armenia and Russia as a strategic partnership. However, he stressed that the economic cooperation between two countries is developing intensively, and Russia intends to promote economic cooperation with Armenia

in the future. In addition, the Russian leader mentioned Armenia's chairmanship at the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) this year, and gave a significant importance to have a talk about regional security issues, specifically in their border. On the other hand, the Armenian leader firmly demonstrated country's support for Russia's position in relation to Syria war, and expressed Armenia's gratefulness for Russia's active involvement in the regulation of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement.

While Putin introduces a clear definition for their bilateral relationship as a strategic partnership, it can be said that it is just a unilateral interpretation by Russia. Perhaps Russia views Armenia as a strategically important country in the South Caucasus, as far as other regional countries such as Georgia and Azerbaijan do not demonstrate a strong endorsement for Russia's foreign policy. For example, Georgia's unfavorable relationship with Russia can be evidently seen as a result of Georgia War (2008). On the other hand, Azerbaijan's foreign policy in relation to Russia is more distant than Armenia's. Namely, Azerbaijan does not cooperate with Russia in the framework of the CSTO, in turn it is a member of GUAM which is an organization that consists of the Western-oriented countries such as Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. Therefore, given Armenia's membership in the CSTO provides us with another argument to claim about Russia's close relations with Armenia, than with Azerbaijan. Consequently, Armenia receives the status as a strategically important country for Russia.

Nevertheless, it can be argued that Russia does not give much strategic significance for Armenia, since an economic role is central for Armenia's interpretation about Russia's role. Armenia entered into the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in 2015 where Russia holds a dominant market power. However, introducing a significant economic outcome of Armenia's accession to the union is challenging, since it is a new member and the economic outcome can be seen in the long-run. Arguably, Armenia's step towards the EEU has an intention to derive an economic benefit from Russia's market. For example, after Armenia's entrance



The Armenian leader firmly demonstrated its support for Russia's position in relation to Syria war.



www.arka.am

to the EEU, duties on natural gas, oil products, and raw diamond delivered from Russia were abolished. Moreover, Russia is one of the biggest investors in Armenia's economy. But, last year Russia reduced its investments in more than 12 times, in comparison to 2014. Following this, it can be claimed that Armenia perceives Russia differently, namely as an economic partner. However, one may say that Russia is strategically important for Armenia as well, because of Russia's standing on Armenian side in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Though, given Russia's military support to Azerbaijan along to Armenia demonstrates Russia's neutral position in the conflict to some extent, therefore, it would be inappropriate to say about a considerable strategic importance of Russia to Armenia.

Taking everything into consideration, the meeting between two leaders has resulted in sharing common views on the burning issues. Both sides expressed support for each other, that is to say, while Russia supported Armenia's position on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenia was satisfied by Russia's role in Syria war. It can be said their mutual support enhances the prospect for bilateral relationship. Whether one finds the other strategically or economically important, it seems both countries would enjoy fruitful cooperation by having mutual support and shared interest.



It can be claimed that Armenia perceives Russia differently, namely as an economic partner.



БОРЬБА ПРОТИВ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОГО ТЕРРОРИЗМА ДОЛЖНА СТАТЬ ВСЕОБЩЕЙ

Dr. Erkin Baydarov



www.chechnyafree.ru

Начало третьего тысячелетия ознаменовалось новым всплеском террористических атак на всем пространстве нашей планеты. В преамбуле Декларации ООН о мерах по ликвидации международного терроризма констатируется, что Генеральная Ассамблея ООН выражает глубокую озабоченность тем, что «во многих регионах мира все чаще совершаются акты терроризма, в основе которых лежит нетерпимость или экстремизм». Со всех концов планеты то и дело поступают сообщения о новых актах

терроризма, жертвами которых становятся ни в чем не повинные люди.

Новый террористический акт в Турции (Стамбул, 19 марта 2016) в результате которой погибло пять человек (в том числе и сам террорист-смертник) и около 40 человек получили ранения и были госпитализированы, еще раз показал, что против Турции международный терроризм объявил самую настоящую войну. В связи с этим, меры, предпринимаемые Анкарой по противодействию актам экстремизма

и терроризма, находят поддержку всего цивилизованного мира. Свои соболезнования в связи с терактом выразил председатель Европарламента Мартин Шульц.

Теракт в Стамбуле последовал после двух крупных терактов в Анкаре (13 марта и 17 февраля 2016 г.), в результате которых погибло около 60 человек. По мнению официальных турецких властей, за этими атаками стоят внушительные силы. По крайней мере, утверждение о том, что против Турции международный терроризм объявил самую настоящую войну находит поддержку и у некоторых членов правительства считающих, что атаки на Турции координируются, так сказать, международным альянсом.

Как сообщил Reuters, за терактом в Стамбуле стоит Рабочая партия Курдистана. Ответственность за террористический акты в Анкаре, взяла на себя на себя другая курдская террористическая группировка «Соколы свободы Курдистана» (ССК), известная также как «Ястребы свободы Курдистана». Об этом говорится в заявлении, распространенном на сайте организации. ССК в Турции считается связанной с Рабочей партией Курдистана группировкой, и обе эти организации Анкара признает террористическими.

ССК отметила, что терактом 13 марта она хотела привлечь к ответу власть, которая проводит спецоперации на юго-востоке Турции против курдских сепаратистов. Эти действия группировка назвала «геноцидом». В заявлении также отмечается, что целью теракта были представители силовых структур в Анкаре.

Шаги, которые предпринимает Турция, чтобы обезопасить не только своих граждан, но и многочисленных граждан других государств, сохранения своей государственности и т.д. должны найти поддержку мирового сообщества.

Однако, какими бы «благородными» целями не объявляли свои поступки РПК или ССК, ответ один: терроризму нет места в человеческом сообществе.

Как справедливо отметил Президент Республики Казахстан Н.А. Назарбаев: «Весь исторический опыт развития человеческой цивилизации свидетельствует, что изначально из всех необходимых условий, в рамках которых осуществляется поступательный и устойчивый рост государства, является безопасность его нации и сохранение государственности...». Поэтому те шаги, которые предпринимает Турция, чтоб обезопасить не только своих граждан, но и многочисленных граждан других государств, посещающих Турцию, сохранения своей государственности и т.д. должны найти поддержку мирового сообщества. Ибо борьба против международного терроризма должна стать всеобщей. Недавний теракт в Брюсселе тому доказательство.

«во многих регионах мира все чаще совершаются акты терроризма, в основе которых лежит нетерпимость или экстремизм».



Во многих регионах мира все чаще совершаются акты терроризма, в основе которых лежит нетерпимость или экстремизм.





THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN KERRY'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

Lidiya Parkhomchik

The main aim of Kerry's visit to Moscow is to discuss ongoing efforts of the International Syria Support Group to maintain the cessation of hostilities, provide aid and improve and expand humanitarian access.

On March 23-25, 2016, the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry will visit Russia to meet with Russian officials. It is scheduled that he will hold meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. According to the U.S. State Secretary, his visit to Moscow, which is the first this year and the third over the past 12 months, is an "important moment" in relations between the United States and Russia, especially, after Moscow announced a pullback of Russian forces in Syria this month.

It is quite obvious that the main aim of Kerry's visit to Moscow is to discuss ongoing efforts

of the International Syria Support Group to maintain the cessation of hostilities, provide aid and improve and expand humanitarian access. Besides, the parties will also talk over efforts combating the Islamic State group.

Moreover, the purpose of the trip could be defined as a desire of the White House to determine whether Russia is eager to facilitate a political transition in Syria removing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from power taking into account the ongoing cease-fire in war-torn Syria declared on the ground of Geneva peace talks between rebels and the Syrian government.

Furthermore, there is a strong necessity to resolve the situation of joint monitoring of the ceasefire by the Russian and the U.S. militaries. Actually, on the eve of the U.S. State Secretary arrival Moscow slammed Washington for delaying the enforcement of a ceasefire in Syria. The Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, the Lieutenant General Sergei Rudskoi, stated that Washington showed "no readiness" to discuss the agreement with Russia noting that the delay in the entry into force of the rules agreed upon for responding to violations of the ceasefire in Syria is unacceptable.



On March 23-25, 2016, the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry will visit Russia to meet with Russian officials.



Therefore, Kerry's two-day visit would definitely be focused on reducing tensions between the parties. However, there is no guarantee that could reach a consensus about the Syrian case especially if American side will continue to keep pushing at Russia on the issue of Ukraine. Of course, the visit of the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry to Russia clearly demonstrates that the White House attaches great importance to its relations with the Kremlin and intends to put the Russian-American relations back to normal. Nevertheless, at the present moment it would be rather hard to recreate a climate of confidence between Russia and the U.S., which continue to play the major role in contemporary international relations.

THE FEDERAL RESERVE KEEPS RATES UNCHANGED

Daniyar Nurbayev

In the press release dated 16 March 2016, the Federal Reserve System (FED) announced that Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decides to leave federal funds rate and discount rate unchanged for the second meeting in a row. Earlier, in December 2015, the Fed's Board of Governors unanimously voted to raise the federal funds rate from 0.0-0.25% to 0.25-0.5% and to raise the discount rate from 0.75% to 1.0%. It was the first decision to raise interest rates since 2006 when FED started to lower the rates to stabilize the economy during the economic downturn, and for the last seven years, the federal funds rate was nearly at zero level.

The decision to raise rates in December 2015 was based on




In December 2015, the Fed's Board of Governors unanimously voted to raise the federal funds rate from 0.0-0.25% to 0.25-0.5%.



such facts as a stable inflation and unemployment level and steady economic growth. In addition, one of the reasons to raise the interest rates was that the low rates, coupled with gains from emission of \$3.7 trillion known as quantitative easing, boosted financial markets rather than real economy. Thus, one of the reasons to raise the rates was a fear to generate one more financial bubble.

FOMC in their last meeting along with unchanged rates changed their projections which were made in December 2015 meeting. In December 2015, FED planned to hike the rates four times in 2016 and 2017, from 0.25% to 1.4% and 1.4% to 2.4% respectively. With the new projections, the FOMC now plans to hike rates



only two times in both years, and projects to achieve 0.9% by the end of 2016 and 1.9% by the end of 2017. Long run federal funds rate fall from 3.5% to 3.25% in new projections. Moreover, FED also reduces its GDP growth outlook for 2016 from 2.4% to 2.2% and for 2017 from 2.2% to 2.1%. However, unemployment rate stays unchanged for 2016, while for 2017 it is expected to decrease from 4.7% to 4.6%. In addition, the monetary authority cut their inflation forecast from 1.6% to 1.2% in 2016.

FED's interest rate hikes negatively affect the developing and emerging economies, mostly commodity exporting countries. The interest hikes have two negative effects. First, during the period of near zero FED's rates, easy money encouraged investors to take a risk and they increased their investment in the developing and emerging economies. While high FED's rates make the new investment costly for investors, they



FED's interest rate hikes negatively affect the developing and emerging economies, mostly commodity exporting countries.



start to withdraw their funds from emerging markets and invest in the US economy. The second reason is that there is empirical evidence that appreciated the US dollar has the negative effect on the commodity prices, which means that commodity-exporting emerging countries would suffer from investment outflow and from decreasing trade balance. In conclusion, it is important to note that emerging countries should pay high attention to changes in FED's rate.




interest rate

www.mortgageadvicebureau.com

18 НАУРЫЗ 2016 ЖЫЛЫ ОРЫН АЛҒАН ҚЫРҒЫЗ-ӨЗБЕК ШЕКАРА МӘСЕЛЕСІ

Dinara Taldibayeva



www.ca-news.org

18 наурызда Қырғызстанның Жалалабад облысы Ала-Бука ауданы Могол елдімекенінде Өзбекстан мен Қырғызстан арасындағы даулы шекара аймағында Өзбекстан өз тарапынан екі БТР мен екі КамАЗ әскери көліктерін қойғаннан кейін екі ел арасында келіспеушіліктер басталды. Сондай-ақ, Өзбекстанның 40 әскери қызметкері сол аймақта орналасып, Өзбекстан біржақты түрде «Маданият» бақылау-өткізу пунктін толықтай жапқан болатын. «Достық» автожол бақылау бекетінде Өзбекстан азаматтар мен көліктердің өтуіне шектеулер қойды. Осылайша Қырғызстан азаматтарына Өзбекстаннан шығуға рұқсат етіліп, кіруге тыйым салынады. Ал Өзбекстан азаматтарына қандай да бір шектеу қойылмаған. Ал үшінші елдің азаматтары үшін халықаралық пункттен транзиттік өту қалыпты түрде жалғасуда. Қырғызстан өз тарапынан аталмыш оқиғаның себебін сұрайтын хат



Жалпы Орта Азия аймағында Қырғызстан, Өзбекстан және Тәжікстан елдері арасында әр көктем сайын шекара мәселесінің орын алуы қалыпты жағдайға айналып бара жатқандай.



жолдаса да Өзбекстан тарапы әлі қанағаттандырылғы жауап бермеді. Өзбекстан Мемлекеттік шекараны қорғау комитетінің жауабы бойынша әскери техникалардың барлығы Өзбекстан аумағында орналастырылған, ал мемлекеттік шекара аумағын қорғау екіжақты келісімдер шеңберінде, шешілмеген аймақтарға кірместен жүзеге асырылады делінген.

Кеңес Одағы ыдырағаннан кейін қырғыз-өзбек шекарасының шамамен төрттен бір бөлігі шешілмеген күйінде қалып, әлі күнге дейін келіспеушіліктердің орын алуына себеп болуда. Тек соңғы 3 жылдың өзінде шекара аймағында бірнеше ондаған қарулы оқиға орын алған болатын.

Аталмыш оқиға орын алғаннан кейін Қырғызстан тарапы Ұжымдық Қауіпсіздік келісім-шарт ұйымына (ҰҚШҰ) мәселенің шешімін табуға атсалысуы үшін сұраныс жасаған. Сондай-ақ аймақ тұрғындары шекара мәселесін шешуге Ресей Президенті В.Путинге хат жолдаған. Жалпы Орта Азия аймағында Қырғызстан, Өзбекстан және Тәжікстан елдері арасында әр көктем сайын шекара мәселесінің орын алуы қалыпты жағдайға айналып бара жатқандай. Аймақтағы осы үш ел арасындағы шекара сызықтарының әлі күнге дейін толықтай шешілмеуі сыртқы күштердің мүддесі үшін өте қолайлы жағдай тудыраы белгілі. Сол үшін де шекара мәселесінің әрқашан осылай шешілмеген күйінде қалуы аймақтың тыныс-тіршілігін

бақылауда ұстап тұруды қалайтын үшінші бір елдің қалауымен орындалуда деуге болады. Аймақ елдерінің дезинтеграциясы үшін ара-тұра осылай шекара мәселесі немесе этникалық сипаттағы келіспеушіліктердің орын алып отыруы қажетті жағдай ретінде қалыптасып қалған. Ал шекара мәселесінің осылай әлі күнге дейін жалғасын тауып келе жатқанының себебі сонау Кеңес одағы кезеңінде Орта Азия елдері арасында шекара сызықтарының белгіленуі болашақта осылай дау тудыратындай мәселе болады деген үмітпен жасалғандығында жатыр деуге болады.



www.catoday.org

ISLANDS OF PLASTIC WASTE HARMING THE MARINE ECOSYSTEM

Saule Akhmetkaliyeva

According to the Ocean Conservancy and the McKinsey Center for Business and Environment, there would be one ton of plastic waste for every three tons of fish in ocean by 2025. It is believed that if the measures are taken in the nearest future, the plastic waste could be cut down by 50% by 2020.


40% of the world is covered in billions of pounds of debris such as plastic waste and sludge. The amount of plastic waste exceeds 5.25 trillion pieces of plastic and this number increases by 8 million tons of plastic each year. According to the Ocean Conservancy and the McKinsey Center for Business and Environment, there would be one ton of plastic waste for every three tons of fish in ocean by 2025. Besides, recently researchers of the World Economic Forum have predicted that by 2050 there would be more plastic garbage than fish.

Oceanic currents gather and clump together plastic debris floating in the ocean into single patches of garbage hundreds of miles in diameter, also called gyres. There are five major gyres in the world. One of the biggest ones being the Pacific Gyre. The existence of the Great Pacific Gyre was

first predicted in 1988 by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) of the United States and later was discovered by Charles J. Moore in 1999. According to Moore, the gyre weighs around 100 million tons. It is still uncertain whether the Pacific Gyre occupies a territory twice as big as the territory of France or the continental USA. However, due to small plastic pieces making up the patch and to low density of 4 particles per cubic meter the gyres are impossible to detect on satellite images. There is also another plastic gyre in the Atlantic Ocean, known as the North Atlantic garbage patch.

It is believed that countries such as China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam contribute more than half of the plastic waste in the oceans as only 40% of waste in these countries

Plastic waste ocean gyres



www.searchair.files.worldpress.com

is disposed properly, and the rest pollutes the oceans as plastic litter. Nevertheless, even proper waste management does not always prove efficient disposal as poorly designed landfills often cause a threat of trash travelling to waters.

The plastic in waters is harmful to the ecosystem of the oceans, as it poses danger of extinction to specific species of fish and seabirds. The plastic in ocean waters is often mistaken for food by marine creatures and seabirds. The animals that consume colorful plastic die from being unable to digest. Unable to move and consume any real food the marine creatures starve themselves to death. Moreover, consumption of plastic pieces by planktons and fish often poisons sea food chain supply. For instance, the microscopic toxic plastic pieces ingested by microorganisms go up the food chain and finally, is consumed by human beings as toxic chemicals.

Most of the single use plastic takes ages to degrade. Therefore, some policy makers are pursuing a shift to biodegradable plastic material that is less harmful to the environment. Moreover, according to the Ocean Conservancy report measures such as improvement of waste collection services and elimination of the leakage

points, establishment and improvement of recycling facilities, as well as gasification and incineration of waste, because only about 20% of waste is worth recycling, and the rest needs to be get rid of. It is believed that if the measures are taken in the nearest future, the plastic waste could be cut down by 50% by 2020.

The cleanup operations are estimated to cost at least \$10 billion. Even though several cleanup projects were initiated in the past, despite the efforts the problem of plastic debris in the ocean waters remains unresolved.

Patch of plastic pollution



www.planetfashiontv.com

RISKS AND DEVELOPMENT IN KAZAKH FINANCIAL MARKETS

Assoc. Prof. Hayal Ayca Simsek

Despite the negative effects of the sharp decline in oil prices and the August 2015 devaluation of tenge, Kazakhstan financial system has been improving especially due to the Economic Support Program for 2014-2015 which was launched by the Government and other financial measures that had been taken to achieve stability in financial markets. The main purpose of the Government Program was to solve the credit problems of the banking sector and reduce the level of non-performing loans. The government, together with the National Bank of Kazakhstan also implemented specific financial measures aiming to maintain financial stability in markets such as increasing the role of tenge in economy, stimulating the growth of tenge liquidity of banks to further increase lending for the economy and recovering the banking sector. Since the beginning of 2015, the inflationary pressures have increased which has a distortionary effect on price stability. In these circumstances, The National Bank of Kazakhstan decided to implement an inflation targeting strategy to keep inflation at low levels (approximately between 6% and 8%). After accepting the floating exchange rate regime, the Government and the National Bank of Kazakhstan jointly decided to implement the inflation targeting strategy in 20 August 2015 which is one of the most important financial measures to achieve price stability.



The Ministry of Finance has been implementing specific measures to strengthen the Treasury System in order to achieve a better financial management.



However, there have still been problems in the financial sector, especially in public financial management. For instance, there is a disconnection between sector planning and budgeting functions and priorities which causes excessive expenditures to be spent on inconvenient fields. Besides, poor quality initial budget estimates lead to significant cost escalations. Most importantly, weak project accounting capacity causes weak financial management and accountability in markets. In order to solve the problem of disconnection between sector planning and budgeting functions

and priorities, the National Bank of Kazakhstan and The Ministry of Finance have been collaborating to improve coordination planning and institutional improvements have been supported through technical assistance on knowledge and experience sharing.



Besides, The Ministry of Finance has been implementing specific measures to strengthen the Treasury System in order to achieve a better financial management. These measures are being implemented by transitioning public funds through the Treasury. During the transition, the public organizations can easily access to a more efficient way of processing payments and information on transactions can be accessed online. This system includes an initial assessment of the Treasury System, the design of funds flow procedure, pilot transfers of three largest projects into



The Ministry has been implementing measures to reduce the time between the preparation of cost estimates and provision of funding.



the Treasury and the assessment of the piloting results.

In order to solve the problem of poor quality initial budget estimates which lead to significant cost escalations, the Ministry of Finance supports preparation of realistic budget estimates and minimize changes to project designs. Besides, The Ministry has been implementing measures to reduce the time between the preparation of cost estimates and provision of funding. On the other hand, in order to reduce the time cost in financial transactions, the paperless processing of payments are now accepted in the Treasury System which reduces time costs for especially public organizations and improves internal controls over the flow of funds. The problem of weak project accounting capacity which causes weak financial management and accountability is planned to be solved by building capacity and train implementing agencies on project accounting. Moreover, transactions and transfers in different currencies both within Kazakh financial markets and in international markets can be made more efficiently. This means that there will be no fees for currency conversion and funds which are in the form national currency are not kept in transit accounts. In this way, potential exchange rate losses can be partially avoided.

By implementing the above measures, the Ministry of Finance aims to increase the accountability and performance of the financial management in Kazakh financial markets. This system will also be more functional and efficient not only in currency transactions but also in other financial assets.

KYRGYZ-UZBEK BORDER PROBLEMS: THE CASE OF THE CHALASART AREA

Lidiya Parkhomchik



On March 26, 2016, the Chairman of the State Border Service of Kyrgyzstan, Raimberdi Duishenbiev, announced that Uzbekistan has withdrawn its troops from a disputed section of border with Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz military forces made similar actions. That was possible as a result of the negotiations, which took place on March 25, 2016, between the Heads of State Border Services from Kyrgyz and Uzbek sides. It was also stated that after all military forces have been pulled back the border defense services would operate in routine regime.

It should be mentioned that according to the Kyrgyz officials, Uzbek troops arrived in the Chalasart area in the Aksy district of the Jalal-Abad region



Despite the fact that the current stand-off has been passed, there is no clear evidence that a long-term understanding over the Chalasart area was reached.



deploying up to 40 troops to the unmarked section of road linking the Kyrgyz settlements of Kerben and Ala-Buka on March 18, 2016. In response, Kyrgyz troops blocked roads linking the Uzbek enclaves of Sokh and Shahimardan to the rest of the country. It is worth mentioning that according to the Uzbek side, the mobilization was a routine reinforcement for Nowruz festivities and all military equipment were located on the territory of Uzbekistan and did not cross non-demarcated sections. However, such a statement was refuted by Kyrgyzstan which insisted on violating the bilateral agreements, according to which neither of the parties could enter disputed areas with troops and military equipment.

Despite the fact that the current stand-off has been passed, there is no clear evidence that a long-term understanding over the Chalasart area was reached. In fact, that there are dozens of problematic sections of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border, any of which could increase the tension between the Central Asian states. After the collapse of the Soviet Union nearly a quarter of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border remains undelimited. Over the past three years there were several dozen border incidents involving the use of weapons. Actually, there are a great deal of occasional incidents of people

“

After the collapse of the Soviet Union nearly a quarter of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border remains undelimited.

”

crossing the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border illegally or accidentally walking herds of cattle into neighboring territory. However, it is the first time that Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan deployed their armed forces over the disputed territories.

Therefore, there is a strong necessity to ensure the border security in order to avoid similar incidents on more than 50 sections of border like the one at the Chalasart area. Especially, in view of the fact that Kyrgyzstan is the member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, it potentially can intervene in a possible conflict.

THE BANKING SECTOR OF KAZAKHSTAN INCREASED BY MORE THAN A THIRD OVER THE YEAR

Daniyar Nurbayev

“

The banking sector decreased its non-performing loans share (NPL) from 23.52% to 8.32%

”



According to the National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK), the assets of the banking sector increased by 37% between January 2015-January 2016 period. Net loans of the banking sector for the same period increased by 35.1% while brutto loans increased only by 11.9%. The assets and loans of the banks increased despite the economic downturn in Kazakhstan, and the main reason for such growth is not the issued loans but assets revaluation due to the devaluation of tenge. As for January 2016, loans in a foreign currency account for 35% of all banking sector loans, which along with almost 100% tenge devaluation is the reason for the assets growth. Along with the growth in assets, the liabilities of the banking sector increased substantially (41.3%), while clients' deposits increased by 67.1%. The growth in the liabilities (such as growth in assets) was due to the currency devaluation (as for January 2016, 70% of clients' deposits is in foreign currency).

In this period, the banking sector underwent significant changes. First, the number of the banks decreased from 38 to 35. Two banks from top3, JSC "Kazkommertsbank" (KKB) and JSC "BTA Bank" (BTA) merged into one, and JSC "Alliance Bank", JSC "Temirbank" and JSC "ForteBank" merged into JSC "ForteBank". Second, the banking sector decreased its non-performing loans share (NPL) from 23.52% to 8.32%, which was the objective of NBK (NBK in 2014 issued a prudential norm which limits upper ceiling of the banks' NPL share at 15% level).

The merging of KKB and BTA was important for the banking sector. BTA accounted for 55% of baking sector's NPL, and after the merging operation, KKB wrote off all BTA's NPL (1.852 trillion tenge). In addition, to this write



According to the National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK), the assets of the banking sector increased by 37% between January 2015-January 2016 period.



off operation, in order to satisfy the regulator's prudential norm, other Kazakh banks also wrote off their NPL. The write off operation sizably decreased the banking sector's brutto loans, but due to tenge devaluation, brutto loans were able to growth by 11.9%.

The information above shows that the changes in the Kazakh banking system in 2015 were not driven by market forces (such as better underwriting process, a large number of issued loans), but rather by the regulator's decisions. That's why, these changes in the banking sector are not expected to have much positive effect on the profitability of the banking sector. For example, despite the huge growth in assets and substantial decline in NPL the banks were able to increase their profits only by 4.76%. Moreover, most of the banking sector's profit were made by high income from dealing operations (currency exchange operations), which was the result of high volatility in the currency market and increased by 264.2% during the reporting period.



The national bank of Kazakhstan

CHINA-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS IN TERMS OF THE SILK ROAD ECONOMIC BELT

Akbota Akylbayeva



China-Afghanistan: the Silk Road Economic Belt

www.khaama.com

Despite worldwide downward dynamics of economic recession, Chinese economy remains stable with the increase of 6.9% in 2015. During the Annual Session of the Chinese National People's Congress, it was stated that China's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) reached \$10.4 trillion in 2015. This increase in GDP has led to an increase in personal income and rise of economic performance across the country. According to the recent analytical predictions, in 2020 China's GDP is projected to reach \$15 trillion, contributing to the worldwide economy.

Since 2013, China strives to promote construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime, with



China strives to promote construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime, with the initiative of promoting chorus of economic prosperity across the region.



the initiative of promoting chorus of economic prosperity across the region. For the last three years, the project has been effectively functioning on the landscape of Central Asia. However, the main challenge for the Chinese Government has been an important neighboring country of Afghanistan that remains politically and economically unstable for the last fourteen years. Through the last years, there have been a number of debates of political and economic risks that China may face while creating a close partnership with Afghanistan that has been struggling with terrorist organization of Taliban during the last decade.



Still with common efforts, in 2014 China-Afghanistan Strategic Cooperative Partnership has been formed to deepen bilateral partnership among the states. The project of the Silk Road Economic Belt would create new opportunities for Afghanistan in terms of export, logistics and economy.

Moreover, Chinese officials have stressed several fields in which they would like to cooperate with Afghanistan in terms of the Silk Road Economic Belt project. The first initiative is related to Policy Coordination of strategies related to economic development in Afghanistan. The second initiative is related to Facilities Connectivity in terms of transportation system. The project aims at enhancing the construction of transportation infrastructure, such as railway system connecting Afghanistan and other neighboring states. The third initiative is the formation of free trade among

the states because these countries, share a large portion of trade exchange. During the fiscal year of 2014-2015 the bilateral trade reached \$1.05 billion. The fourth initiative is related with financial integration of Afghanistan in Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which would be a huge step in stabilizing Afghan economy. The fifth and the last initiative is related with cultural exchange among nations, tightening of traditional friendship among the countries.

To conclude, if these initiatives to be implemented, it would have a huge



The project of the Silk Road Economic Belt would create new opportunities for Afghanistan in terms of export, logistics and economy.



impact on the development of Afghanistan. It would not only promote free trade among the states, but also generate mutual trust between Afghanistan and China.


Despite future positive aspects of the Afghan engagement in the Silk Road Economic Belt project, there are risks that China may face, which include attacks of terrorist organization of Taliban and political insecurity. These problems may jeopardize the effectiveness of the project in the first place, negatively affecting the whole region.

FUNDS ALLOCATED TO PROTECT LAKE BAIKAL

Saule Akhmetkaliyeva

The government of Russia, namely, the administration of the Republic of Buryatia, the Trans Baikal Territory and the Irkutsk region, allocated funds from the federal budget worth 1.29 billion rubles or \$18.9 million in order to protect the Lake Baikal in 2016. The funds are aimed to co-finance construction and modernization of waste disposal facilities, heat supply systems and other infrastructures in the surrounding area. The funds are also to aid the social and economic development of the Baikal region.

The current environmental situation around the globe has affected the water level in 1642 meters deep Lake Baikal, which is the deepest freshwater lake in the world. According to the Federal Water Resources Agency, Rosvodresurs, as of January 2016, the water level of the lake constitutes 456 meters above the Pacific Ocean, which is four centimeters shorter than the safe minimum. This water level is 40 centimeters lower than it was in 2013. The lowering of the



Satellite view of Lake Baikal

www.eoimages.gsfc.nasa.gov

water level was first registered in fall 2014. Since 1962 the lake has fallen below the 456-meter mark 11 times with lowest depth of 455.27 meters in 1982.

The shrinking of the lake is mainly caused by an increase of the atmospheric temperature and a decrease of participation in the region. Moreover, climate change and anthropogenic effects have also led to the lowering of water level of the Lake Baikal. The aforementioned reasons have also led to an increase of the water temperature, which, on the other hand, led to algal blooms that negatively affect the ecosystem of the lake. As a result of shrinking of the lake lagoons located at the perimeter of the lake are to disappear depriving marine animals and mammals of their natural habitat.

50% of water inflowing into the lake comes from the Selenga River. Recently, decline in the amount of discharge from the river was noticed. Besides, as the Selenga River serves as a spawning place, the water level fluctuation is to affect the fisheries. This might further lead to suspension of commercial fishing in the Baikal region. Meanwhile, the Angara River, outflowing from the lake serves as a source of hydropower. Electricity generated at the hydropower plant powers up Irkutsk, one of the largest cities of Russia. The water level of the lake is regulated by this hydropower infrastructure. The decrease of the water level of the lake poses threats to the efficiency of the hydropower generation by the plant, as well as to the

Lake Baikal



www.strangesounds.org



The government of Russia allocated funds from the federal budget worth 1.29 billion rubles or \$18.9 million in order to protect the Lake Baikal in 2016. According to Rosvodresurs, as of January 2016, the water level of the lake constitutes 456 meters above the Pacific Ocean, which is four centimeters shorter than the safe minimum.



wellbeing of the ecosystem and the biosphere of the lake. Moreover, the shallowing has a potential to increase the frequency of peat bog fires. This would have negative effect on the region which is already prone to forest fires. For instance, forest fires in Siberia reached the number of 146 in August 2015. Forest fires increase the air temperature, and therefore, the amount of evaporation, lowering the water level of the lake even further.

To conclude, the scientists predict that the level of the lake might drop even further if the situation does not change in the nearest future which will negatively affect the social and economic wellbeing of the local population. Therefore, there are high hopes that the funds allocated by the Russian government are to improve the environmental situation in the region.

США И КУБА: ПРИМЕНЕНИЕ НА ПРАКТИКЕ ИСКУССТВА ЦИВИЛИЗОВАННОГО СОСУЩЕСТВОВАНИЯ

Dr. Erkin Baydarov

Встреча в Гаване может иметь большое влияние на разрешение многих как глобальных, так и внутрирегиональных политических проблем: от решения сирийского кризиса до нормализации российско-турецких отношений.

Столица Кубы – Гавана, во второй раз за последние три месяца нового 2016 года приковало к себе взгляды всего мирового сообщества. Впервые почти спустя 90 лет (впервые с 1928 года) лидер крупнейшей мировой державы, каким являются США, посетил так называемый «остров свободы».

Находясь очень далеко от евразийского континента, и не оказывая прямого влияния на проблемы Евразии, тем не менее, встреча в Гаване может иметь большое влияние на разрешение многих как глобальных, так и внутрирегиональных политических проблем: от решения сирийского кризиса до нормализации российско-турецких отношений и т.д. и т.п.

Встреча лидера Кубы Рауля Кастро и президента США Барака Обамы состоялась 21 марта во Дворце революции в Гаване. Как написал американский президент на своей странице в Facebook: «Я приехал, чтобы протянуть руку дружбы кубинскому народу. У нас продолжают оставаться серьезные разногласия между нашими правительствами, включая глубокие разногласия по вопросам, связанным с укреплением безопасности и прав



человека. Но есть столько всего, что объединяет американцев и кубинцев – наша культуры и привязанности, наши надежды относительно будущего... Я уверен, что, работая вместе с кубинским народом, обе наши страны могут начать новое совместное путешествие, которое обеспечит прогресс для двух наших народов».

Для Кубы очень важно, чтобы Соединенные Штаты отменили блокаду, вернули территорию, оккупированную военно-морской базой в Гуантанамо, и устранили меры, которые наносят вред суверенитету страны. Именно решение этих проблем, было



Встреча двух лидеров в Гаване, открывает широкие перспективы как в двухстороннем сотрудничестве, так и вселяет надежду на то, что применение на практике искусства цивилизованного сосуществования станет моделью для всего мирового сообщества.



условием для нормализации отношений между Гаваной и Вашингтоном. Естественно, что разница в подходах двух стран по таким вопросам, как политические системы, демократия, права человека, национальный суверенитет, международное право, также является камнем преткновения.

Знаменательным моментом, предшествовавшей встрече двух лидеров стал момент, когда Б. Обама сфотографировался на фоне барельефа Эрнесто Че Гевары, одного из лидеров кубинской революции, убитого в свое время при активном участии американских разведывательных служб.

Данный визит американского лидера в страну стал первым за 88 лет. Визит, как отметило агентство Reuters, стал кульминацией дипломатических усилий США и Кубы по «завершению холодной войны». Однако, встреча президента США с лидером кубинской революции, легендой XX века Фиделем Кастро не состоялось ввиду отсутствия его в графике американского лидера. Скорее всего, сам легендарный команданте отказался от этой встречи.

Следует отметить, что разрыв дипломатических отношений между США и Кубой произошел в 1961 году. Это стало реакцией на напряженные отношения властей США с революционным правительством Фиделя Кастро. Правительство Америки тогда ввело эмбарго в отношении Кубы. Процесс восстановления начался только в июле 2015 года. Этому предшествовали первые полноценные переговоры Обамы и

Рауль Кастро и Барак Обама на Саммите американских государств в Панаме в апреле 2015 года



Рауля Кастро на саммите Америк в Панаме в апреле 2015 года, став первой в истории США и Кубы более чем за 50 лет. Некоторое время спустя США исключили Кубу из списка стран - спонсоров терроризма. 1 июля стало известно, что Куба и США договорились об открытии своих диппредставительств. 20 июля после полувекового перерыва США и Куба восстановили дипломатические отношения: в Вашингтоне было открыто кубинское посольство. И уже 14 августа 2015 года, над посольством США в Гаване подняли американский флаг. Участвовавший в церемонии госсекретарь США Джон Керри назвал это событие историческим, а поднятый флаг — символом восстановления отношений между государствами. Визит самого Керри в Гавану стал первым за последние 70 лет визитом главы Госдепартамента США на Кубу, а флаг над американским посольством был поднят впервые за 54 года.

Во время двух лидеров были обсуждены новые возможности для сотрудничества в торгово-экономической области. По словам Обамы, Куба приглашена на весенний энергетический саммит в Вашингтоне. Кроме того, глава американской администрации подчеркнул, что будет и дальше призывать конгресс США к отмене эмбарго в отношении Кубы. Президент США Барак Обама уверен, что с эмбарго против Кубы

«будет покончено». Вместе с тем он признал, что «не знает, когда это произойдет».

В свою очередь Рауль Кастро призвал президента США Барака Обаму снять больше ограничений с Кубы. Кроме того, Кастро заявил, что возвращение базы Гуантанамо станет важным пунктом для нормализации отношений между двумя странами. Президент США также подчеркнул, что США не рассматривают Кубу как угрозу своей безопасности. Он также отметил, что будущее Кубы будут выбирать сами кубинцы.

На состоявшейся пресс-конференции Рауль Кастро отметил, что сегодняшней задачей является «применить на практике искусство цивилизованного сосуществования», призвав американцев «сконцентрироваться на том, что нас объединяет, а не на имеющихся разногласиях». По словам Рауля Кастро, «разрушить мост — это задача, которую можно решить легко и быстро, а вот построить после этого прочный мост — намного сложнее». Таким образом, кубинский лидер дал понять, что восстановление нормальных отношений с Вашингтоном займет немало времени.

Участники переговоров дали понять, что по целому ряду вопросов плодотворное сотрудничество не только возможно, но и необходимо. В частности, в Гаване стороны договорились об углублении сотрудничества в сельскохозяйственной сфере и сфере безопасности (включая борьбу с наркотрафиком). Кроме того, будет налаживаться транспортное сотрудничество: Барак Обама подтвердил, что регулярные коммерческие авиарейсы на Кубу из США начнутся в этом году. Таким образом, встреча двух лидеров в Гаване, открывает широкие перспективы как в двухстороннем сотрудничестве, так и вселяет надежду на то, что применение на практике искусства цивилизованного сосуществования станет моделью для всего мирового сообщества.

ORTA DOĞU'DAKİ GÜÇ DENGELERİ TARTIŞILDI

ТАЯУ ШЫҒЫСТАҒЫ НЕГІЗГІ МӘСЕЛЕЛЕР ТАЛҚЫҒА ТҮСТІ

1 Mart 2016 tarihinde Gazi Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü Öğretim Üyesi Doç. Dr. Kürşad Turan "Orta Doğu Güç Dengeleri" isimli seminer verdi.

Doç. Dr. Kürşad Turan bu seminerde ana hatlarıyla güç dengeleri hakkındaki bazı teorilere, Orta Doğu ağırlıklı olmak üzere

2016 жылғы 1 наурызда Гази университеті Экономика және әкімшілік ғылымдар факультеті Халықаралық қатынастар бөлімінің оқытушысы доцент, доктор Күршад Туран «Таяу Шығыс күштерінің тепе-теңдігі» атты семинар берді.

Доктор, доцент Күршад Туран семинарда күштердің тепе-теңдіктері туралы кейбір теорияларға, Таяу Шығысқа басымдылық бере отырып, халықаралық оқиғаларға әлемдік және аймақтық күштердің оқиғаларға деген көзқарасына байланысты ақпарат берумен қатар өзінің талдауын да ұсынды. Таяу Шығыстағы тарихи күштердің тепе-теңдігін айтқанда ең маңызды өзгерістердің 1979 жылғы Иран төңкерісі және Иранның АҚШ тарапынан Кеңес Одағы тарапына өтуі және Мысырда Анвар аль-Садаттың президент болып сайлануына байланысты Кеңес Одағымен байланысты үзіп, АҚШ одақтасы болуы сияқты оқиғаларға әкеп соқты.

Қырғи-қабақ соғыстан кейінгі кезеңде Джордж Буштың 2002 жылғы Буш доктринасы





uluslararası olaylarda küresel ve bölgesel güçlerin olaylara yaklaşımına dair bilgiler sunmanın yanında kendi analizlerini de ifade etmiştir. Orta Doğu'da tarihsel güç dengelerinden bahsederken en önemli değişimleri 1979 yılındaki İran devrimi ile İran'ın ABD tarafından Sovyetler Birliği tarafına geçmesi ve Mısır'da Enver Sedat'ın Cumhurbaşkanı olması ile Sovyetler Birliği ile ilişkilerini keserek ABD'nin müttefiki olması olaylarını gösterdi.

Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde ise George W. Bush'un 2002'deki Bush doktrini ile Barack Obama'nın Obama doktrini hakkında detaylı bilgiler vermenin yanında iki doktrinin ABD'nin güvenliği ve Orta Doğu'da dengelerin sağlanması konusunda karşılaştırmalı analizini yaptı. Bush doktrininin güvenlik açısından tehditleri bertaraf etmek ile liberalizm ve demokrasiyi yayarak ülkelerin pazarlarının ABD'ye açılmasını amaçladığını belirtti. Obama doktrininin ise ABD için Asya'da Çin'in artan gücünü Orta Doğu'dan daha önemli bir sorun olarak algıladığını ifade etti. Ayrıca, Rusya, İran ve Küba gibi ülkelerle ilişkileri iyileştirme, deniz aşırı çatışmalara asker göndermeme ve bölgesel dengelerin sağlanmasında kendi müttefiklerine destek vermeyi öngören politikalar izlediğini belirtti. Kısaca, Obama'nın politikasını gerekli baskıları uygularken diplomasi kanallarını devamlı açık tutan bir strateji olarak değerlendirdi.

Seminerin devamında Arap Baharı ve Suriye krizine değinerek ABD ve Rusya'nın olaylara

мен Барак Обаманың доктринасы туралы егжей-тегжейлі ақпарат берумен қатар екі доктринаның АҚШ-тың қауіпсіздігі мен Таяу Шығыстағы тепе-теңдіктің сақталуы тақырыбында салыстырмалы талдау жүргізді. Буш доктринасының қауіпсіздік тұрғысынан қауіп-қатерді болдырмауды және либерализм мен демократияны тарату арқылы мемлекеттердің нарықтарының АҚШ-қа ашық болуын мақсат тұтты. Обама доктринасының АҚШ үшін Азияда Қытайдың артқан күшін Таяу Шығысқа қарағанда маңызды мәселе ретінде қабылдағанын алға тартты. Сонымен қатар Ресей, Иран мен Куба сияқты елдермен байланысты нығайту, теңіздің ар жағындағы қақтығыстарға әскер жібермеуге және аймақтық тепе-теңдіктің сақталуында өзінің одақтастарына қолдау көрсетуге басымдылық берген саясатты ұстанатынын атап өтті. Қысқа қайырғанда, Обаманың саясатын қажетті қысымды көрсете отырып, дипломатиялық жолдарды ашық түрде жалғастырған стратегия ретінде бағалады.

Араб көктемі мен Сирия дағдарысына тоқтала отырып, АҚШ пен Ресейдің оқиғаларға деген көзқарасы мен осы оқиғаларға араласу түрі туралы ақпарат берді. Араб көктемі кезінде АҚШ-тың Тунисадағы оқиғаларға араласпағанын, Ливияда НАТО күштерінің Францияның басшылығымен әрекет еткенін және Мысырмен Сауд Арабиясы мен Түркия арқылы байланысқа түскенін баяндады.



yaklaşımı ve müdahale tarzları hakkında bilgiler verdi. Arap Baharı sırasında ABD'nin Tunus'daki olaylara müdahale etmediğini, Libya'da NATO güçlerinin Fransa önderliğinde devreye girdiğini ve Mısır'la ise Suudi Arabistan ile Türkiye aracılığıyla iletişime geçtiğini ifade etti. Suriye'de ise DAES'in ortaya çıkmasının ardından konuyla ilgilenmeye başladığını belirtti. Rusya'nın Suriye krizine dahil olma nedenleri arasında Rusya'nın Libya'daki rejimin düşmesi ile müttefikini ve de silah ticareti kazancının yanı sıra verilen borçlarını kaybettiğini ve eğer Suriye'deki Esad rejimi düşer ise bir başka müttefikini ve 4,5 milyar dolarlık silah pazarını kaybedeceğini ifade etti. Öte yandan Rusya'nın doğu Ukrayna'yı işgalinin NATO'nun doğuya ilerlemesini durdurma planı olduğunu belirtti. Sözlerinin sonunda Türkiye'nin öğrenmiş olduğu en büyük dersin yerel anlaşmazlıklara küresel aktörler dahil olduğunda burada rekabetten daha çok ortaklıklar yolu ile çözüme gitmesi gerektiğini belirtti. İran ve ABD'deki başkanlık seçimlerinin nükleer anlaşma bağlamında bölgedeki dengeler için önemli olduğunu ifade etti.

Seminerin sonunda katılımcılar ABD ve Rusya ilişkileri, ABD'deki başkanlık seçimleri konularında görüş alışverişinde bulundular.

Сирияда ДАЕШ-тің пайда болуынан кейін тақырыпқа қызығушылық таныта бастағанын алға тартты. Ресейдің Сирия дағдарысына араласуының себептері ретінде, Ресейдің Ливиядағы саяси режимнің құлауына байланысты одақтасын және қару-жарақ саудасынан тапқан пайдамен қатар берілген қарыздарынан айрылып қалғандығын атап өтті. Егер Сирияда Асадтың саяси режимі құласа, тағы бір одақтасынан және 4,5 млрд. долларлық қару-жарақ нарығынан айрылып қалатынын айтты. Басқа жағынан алғанда, Ресейдің Шығыс Украинаны жаулап алуының НАТО-ның шығысқа беталысын тоқтату жоспары болғанын алға тартты. Баяндаманың соңында Түркияның үйренген ең үлкен сабағының жергілікті қақтығыстарға әлемдік актерлер қосылғанда бәсекені ұмытып, одақтастар көмегімен шешім табу керек екеніне тоқталды. Иран мен АҚШ президент сайлауларының ядро келісіміне қатысты аймақтағы тепе-теңдік үшін маңызды екенін атап өтті.

Семинардың соңында қатысушылар АҚШ пен Ресей байланыстары, АҚШ-тағы президент сайлауы тақырыптарына қатысты өз пікірлерін білдірді.



AVRASYA ARAŞTIRMA ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRÜ SAYIN DOÇ. DR. NEVZAT ŞİMŞEK'İN "DÜNYA KAZAKLARI CEMİYETİ" BAŞKAN YARDIMCISI TALĖAT MAMAŞEV İLE GÖRÜŞMESİ

«ДҮНИЕЖҮЗІ ҚАЗАҚТАРЫ
ҚАУЫМДАСТЫҒЫ»
ТӨРАҒАСЫНЫҢ БІРІНШІ
ОРЫНБАСАРЫ
ТАЛҒАТ МАМАШЕВПЕН
КЕЗДЕСУ

9 Mart 2016 tarihinde Avrasya Araştırma Enstitüsü Müdürü Doç. Dr. Nevzat Şimşek "Dünya Kazakları Cemiyeti" Başkan Yardımcısı Talğat Mamaşev ile ikili görüşmede bulundu. Görüşme esnasında Doç. Dr. Nevzat Şimşek enstitünün Ahmet Yesevi Üniversitesi'nin misyonu ve vizyonu çerçevesinde faaliyette bulunduğunu, bu doğrultuda genel olarak Avrasya bölgesine yönelik, özel olarak Türk dili konuşan devlet ile topluluklarla ilgili bilimsel araştırmaları yaparak, bu alandaki çeşitli etkinliklere devam edildiğini dile getirdi ve yapılan etkinliklerle ilgili bilgiler verdi. Ayrıca sempozyumların, kongrelerin ve seminerlerin düzenlendiğini ve her hafta Avrasya bölgesindeki güncel konuların seçilerek üç dilde yayınlanan e-bültenler başta olmak üzere çeşitli yayınlar yapıldığını ifade etti.

"Dünya Kazakları Cemiyeti" Başkan Yardımcısı Talğat Mamaşev ise görüşmede cemiyetin kuruluş tarihinden ve Dünya Kazaklar Kurultay'ından bahsederek, yurt dışından

gelen Kazaklara devletin her türlü yardımı sağladığını, dış ülkelerde yaşayan Kazakların milli geleneği korumaları için cemiyetin çeşitli etkinlikleri düzenlediklerinin altını çizdi. Ayrıca Talğat Mamaşev konuşmasında dünyanın her köşesinde 40 kadar ülkede yaklaşık 5 milyon Kazak'ın yaşadığını, onların temel problemlerinin Dünya Kazaklar Kurultayı kapsamında çözülmeye çalışıldığını dikkat çekerek, enstitü ile ortak etkinlikler düzenlemeye açık olduğuna ve bilimsel araştırma alanında ortak proje ve çalışmaların hazırlamasının gerektiğine değindi.



2016 жылғы 9-наурызда Еуразия ғылыми-зерттеу институтының директоры, э.ғ.д., доцент Невзат Шимшек «Дүниежүзі қазақтары қауымдастығы» төрағасының бірінші орынбасары Талғат Мамашевпен екіжақты кездесу өткізді. Кездесу барысында э.ғ.д., доцент Невзат Шимшек өзі басқарып отырған институттың Ахмет Ясауи университетінің миссиясы мен мақсат-міндеттері аясында жұмыс істейтінін және осы бағытта жалпы Еуразия аймағына қатысты, әсіресе түркітілдес мемлекеттер мен қауымдастықтарға қатысты ғылыми-зерттеу жұмыстарын жүргізіп, түрлі іс-шараларды жүзеге асырып келе жатқанына тоқталып, қазіргі таңға дейін институттың

атқарған іс-шаралары туралы мағлұмат берді. Сондай-ақ, симпозиум, конгресс және семинарлар ұйымдастырылатынын, апта сайын Еуразия аймағындағы маңызды тақырыптарды қозғайтын үш тілде жарияланатын электронды бюллетеньнен бастап түрлі жарияланымдар шығып тұратынын атап өтті.

«Дүниежүзі қазақтары қауымдастығы» төрағасының бірінші орынбасары Талғат Мамашев өз тарапынан қауымдастықтың құрылу тарихы мен Дүниежүзі қазақтарының құрылтайы жайында сөз қозғап, басқа елдерден елге оралған қазақтарға мемлекет



тарапынан түрлі квоталар мен жәрдемдер жасалып жатқанын, сырт елдерде өмір сүретін қазақтардың ұлттық салт-дәстүрін қорғауы үшін қауымдастық тарапынан түрлі шаралар ұйымдастырылып тұратынын атап өтті. Сонымен қатар, әңгіме барысында Талғат Мамашев әлемнің түкпір-түкпірінде орналасқан 40-қа жуық елде шамамен 5 миллиондай қазақтың өмір сүретінін, олардың басты мәселелерін Дүниежүзі қазақтарының құрылтайы аясында шешуге тырысатындарына тоқталып, институтпен бірге ортақ іс-шаралар ұйымдастыруға оң қарайтынын және ғылыми-зерттеу жұмыстарында ортақ жобалар мен жұмыстардың атқарылу қажеттілігін тілге тиек етті.

BİLİMSEL ARAŞTIRMA TEKNİKLERİ NASIL OLMALIDIR?

ҒЫЛЫМИ ЗЕРТТЕУ ЖҰМЫСТАРЫН ЖАЗҒАНДА ҚОЙЫЛАТЫН ТАЛАПТАР ҚАНДАЙ?

11 Mart 2016 tarihinde Gazi Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi İşletme Bölümünden Doç. Dr. Mehmet Baş ve Doç. Dr. Metehan Tolon "Bilimsel Araştırma Teknikleri" konulu seminer verdi.

Doç. Dr. Mehmet Baş ve Doç. Dr. Metehan Tolonbu seminerde ana hatlarıyla araştırma, kaynak, veri gibi sözlerin tanımı ile anket ve mülakat gibi çeşitli araştırma metotları hakkında bilgiler sundular. Birinci kaynak ve ikinci kaynağın arasındaki farka değinerek, araştırma ile derleme çalışmaları arasındaki farklılığa vurgu yaptılar.

Akademik dergilere makale gönderirken dikkat edilmesi gereken hususlar konusunda makalelerde birinci kaynakların olmasının o makalenin seçilme oranını artırabileceği yönünde görüş bildiren Baş ve Tolon, kabul edilmeyen makaleler konusunda ise ret cevabı geldikten sonra o dergiden veya kuruluştan makalenin sistemlerinden çıkarılmasını ısrarla istenilmesi gerektiğini sözlerine eklediler. Çünkü başka dergilerin aynı intihal programlarını kullanması halinde reddedilen makalenin intihal veri bankasında bulunması nedeniyle intihal denetlemesine takılabileceği uyarısında bulunup yaşanmış olaylardan örnekler vererek makale gönderimine ilişkin önerilerde bulundular.

Seminerin soru cevap kısmında katılımcılar araştırmalarını yorumlanması aşaması, anket yapımı, dergilerin intihal sistemleri ve birinci ve kaynak veriler konularında görüş alışverişinde bulundular.



2016 жылғы 11 наурыз күні Гази университеті Экономика және әкімшілік ғылымдар факультеті менеджмент бөлімінің доктор, доценті Мехмет Баш және доктор, доцент Метехан Толон «Ғылыми зерттеу жұмыстарының тетіктері» тақырыбында семинар жүргізді.

Осы семинарда олар зерттеу, дереккөздер, деректер сияқты ұғымдардың түсініктері және анкета мен сауалнама сияқты зерттеу әдістері туралы ақпарат ұсынды. Бірінші және екінші деңгейдегі дереккөздер арасындағы айырмашылыққа тоқталып, зерттеу мен дереккөздерді жинақтау жұмыстары арасындағы айырмашылыққа тоқталды.

Ғылыми журналдарға мақала жібергенде назарға алынуы қажет талаптарға байланысты тақырыпта мақалаларда бірінші деңгейдегі дереккөздердің қолданылуы осы мақаланың таңдалынып алыну мүмкіндігін арттыратынын алға тартты. Баш пен Толон қабылданбаған мақалалар болса, «жарияланбайды» деген жауап келген соң сол журнал редакциясы немесе мекемесінің жүйесінен мақаланың шығарылуын талап ету қажет екенін де тілге тиек етті. Себебі өзге журналдардың да плагиатты тексеретін бірдей бағдарламаларды қолдануына байланысты қабылданбаған мақаланың плагиат деректер қорында сақталуына байланысты плагиат бақылауынан өтпей қалған жағдайларға тап болатынын

ескертіп, оларға мысалдар келтірді және мақаланы жіберуге байланысты кеңестерін айтты.

Семинардың сұрақ-жауап бөлімінде қатысушылар зерттеу жұмысының түсіндірілуі, анкета әзірлеу, журналдардың плагиат жүйелері және бірінші және екінші деңгейдегі дереккөздер тақырыптарында пікір алмасты.



29 MART 2016 TARİHİNDE YILDIRIM BEYAZIT ÜNİVERSİTESİ İNSAN VE TOPLUM BİLİMLERİ FAKÜLTESİ ÖĞRETİM ÜYESİ PROF. DR. MUSTAFA ORÇAN "ALAFRANGADAN ALAMERİKANLAŞMAYA DÜNYA TOPLUMLARININ MODERNLEŞME SERÜVENİ" ADLI SEMİNER VERDİ

2016 ЖЫЛДЫҢ
29 НАУРЫЗЫНДА
ЙЫЛДЫРЫМ БЕАЗЫТ
УНИВЕРСИТЕТІ
ГУМАНИТАРЛЫҚ ЖӘНЕ
ӘЛЕУМЕТТІК ҒЫЛЫМДАР
ФАКУЛЬТЕТІНІҢ ОҚЫТУШЫСЫ
ДОКТОР, ПРОФЕССОР
МҰСТАФА ОРЧАН
«ДҮНИЕЖҮЗІЛІК ҚОҒАМНЫҢ
ЕУРОПАЛАНДЫРУДАН
АМЕРИКАЛАНДЫРУҒА
ДЕЙІНГІ ЖАҢҒЫРУ ТАРИХЫ»
АТТЫ ТАҚЫРЫПТА СЕМИНАР
ӨТКІЗДІ

Prof. Dr. Mustafa Orçan "Alafrangadan Alamerikanlaşmaya Dünya Toplumlarının Modernleşme Serüveni" konulu seminerinde ana hatlarıyla çağdaşlaşma, modernleşme ve Batılılaşma kelimelerinin anlamları ile tipleri hakkında bilgiler sundu. Ayrıca, Alafranganlaşma ve Alamerikanlaşma terimlerini açıklayarak toplumların sosyo-ekonomik durumları üzerine değerlendirmeler yaptı. Çağdaşlaşma, modernleşme ve Batılılaşma kelimelerinin birbirlerinin eş anlamlıları gibi kullanıldığını belirterek derinlemesine



Доктор, профессор Мұстафа Орчан «Дүниежүзілік қоғамның еуропаландырудан америкаландыруға дейінгі жаңғыру тарихы» атты семинарында заманауи бағытқа ұмтылу, жаңғыру, еуропаландыру ұғымдарының мағыналары мен түрлері туралы ақпаратты ұсынды. Сондай-ақ, еуропаландыру және америкаландыру терминдерін түсіндіріп, қоғамның әлеуметтік-экономикалық жағдайына баға берді. Заманауи бағытқа ұмтылу, жаңғыру және еуропаландыру ұғымдары көбінесе синоним ретінде қолданылып жүр. Алайда бұл сөздерді терең зерттеп қараған кезде мағыналарының бір-бірінен қатты ерекшелетіндігі көрінеді.

Бұл тұрғыда жаңғырту мен еуропаландыру заманауи бағытқа ұмтылудың 2 түрі болып табылады. Еуропаландырудың тұтынуға негізделіп, шамадан тыс саяси және тұлғалық өзгерістерге бағытталғандығы, сондай-ақ басқыншы, үстіртін бағыт екендігі айтылды. Жаңғырту ұғымына келгенде, оның өндіріске көңіл бөлетіндігі және саяси-идеологиялық сипат танытудан гөрі рационалды болатындығы баяндалды. Бұл ұғымның өзгерістерге жақын болып, өзгерістің өз бетінше жүзеге асырылатындығы туралы айтылды.

1725 жылы Англияда болған индустриялық революцияның, негізінен, экономикалық революция екендігін айқындаған профессор Мұстафа Орчан 1789 жылғы француз революциясы идеологиялық сипат алып, коммунизм, либерализм сияқты идеологиялардың пайда болуына әсер етті деп түйіндеді. Әлемдегі мемлекеттер бұл екі революциялық бағыттың бірін таңдауға тура

incelendiğinde bu kavramların birbirlerinden çok farklı anlamlarının olduğuna işaret etti.

Bu bağlamda modernleşme ve Batılılaşmanın çağdaşlaşmanın 2 tipi olduğunu ve Batılılaşmanın tüketime dayalı, aşırı politik ve kimliksel dönüşümleri hedeflemenin yanı sıra baskıcı ve yüzeysel olduğunu ifade etti. Modernleşme kavramında ise üretime önem verildiğini, duygusal ve politik olmaktan ziyade daha rasyonel olduğu görüşünü belirterek, bu kavramın değişime açıklığı ve değişimin serbest bırakılmasını içerdiğini sözlerine ekledi.

келді. Түркияның Танзимат кезеңінен бастап өндірісті ұлғайтудан гөрі заманауилыққа бет бұру стратегиясын қабылдағандығына баса назар аударып, индустриялық революция бағытын ұстанбағандығы туралы айтты. Бұның себептері ретінде Түркияның идеологиялық революция бағытын таңдап, жаңғырудан гөрі еуропаландыруға ұмтылғанын айтты. Жапония, Малайзия, Жаңа Зеландия және Австрия сияқты елдердің ағылшын революциясы бағытын таңдап, мәдени-идеологиялық революциядан



1725 yılında İngiltere’de endüstri devriminin ekonomik bir devrim olduğunu belirten Prof. Dr. Orçan, 1789 yılındaki Fransız devriminin ise ideolojik bir devrim olduğundan hareketle komünizm, liberalizm gibi ideolojilerin doğuşuna kapı araladığını ifade etti. Dünya devletlerinin bu iki devrimden birini seçmek zorunda kaldığını belirtti. Türkiye’nin ise Tanzimat döneminden itibaren üretimin arttırılmasından ziyade önceliğinin bir çağdaşlaşma stratejisini olduğuna vurgu yaparak üretim devriminden nasibini pek almadığını ifade etti. Bunun sebepleri arasında

гөрі өндіріске ұмтылу арқасында экономикасы жоғары деңгейде дамыған елдерге айналғандығын атап өтті. Жапония мен Түркия халықтарының жан басына шаққандағы табысын салыстыра келе, Екінші дүниежүзілік соғыстан кейін Жапониядағы жан басына шаққандағы ұлттық табыс 150 АҚШ долларын құрап, Түркиядағы табыс 350 АҚШ долларын құрағандығы жөнінде мәлімдеді. Алайда, бүгінгі таңда бұл көрсеткіштер Жапонияда 35,000 АҚШ

ise Түркия'nin идеолоjik devrim yoluna girdiğini ve modernleşmeden ziyade Batılılaşma yaşadığını belirtti. Japonya, Malezya, Yeni Zelanda ve Avusturya gibi ülkelerin ise İngiliz devrimini seçtiğini belirterek kültürel devrimin yerine üretime odaklanması sayesinde bugünkü refah seviyelerine ulaştıklarını ifade etti. Japonya ve Түркия'nin kişi başına düşen gelir düzeylerini karşılaştırdığı bir örnek ile II. Dünya Savaşı sonrası Japonya'nın kişi başı gelirinin 150\$, Түркия'nin ise 350\$ olduğunu ifade etti. Fakat günümüzde bu rakamların Japonya için 35,000\$, Түркия için ise 10,500\$ civarında olduğunu belirterek iki devrim arasındaki refah seviyesini arttırma konusunda farka dikkat çekti.

Seminerinin devamında modernleşmenin iki tipi Alafrangalaşma ve Alamerikanlaşma arasındaki temel farklara değindi. Bu bağlamda Avrupa kökenli Alafrangalaşmanın elitist ve seçkin kesimlere hitap ettiği için etkisinin sınırlı olduğunu belirtti. Alamerikanlaşma için ise modernleşmeyi küreselleştirmesini ve kitlelere hitap ettiği için kitlesel olmasını ifade etti. Günümüzde Amerikan kültürünün yemekten müziğe Dünya'daki hakim kültür olduğunu ve bazı yerel kültürlerin ise bu akıma karşı çıkarak kendi kültürlerini korumak adına yavaş yemek, sefer taşı gibi çeşitli hareketler düzenlediğini belirtti. Toplumların kendi değerleri ile kalınmasının mümkün olduğu vurgusuyla da seminer sona erdi.


Seminerin sonunda katılımcılar Alafrangalaşma ve Alamerikanlaşma konularında görüş alışverişinde bulundular.



долларын, Түркияда шамамен 10,500 АҚШ долларын құрайтынын айтып, екі революция арасындағы әл-ауқат деңгейін жақсарту жөніндегі айырмашылыққа назар аударды.


Семинар барысында жаңғыртудың екі түрі – еуропаландыру мен америкаландыру арасындағы негізгі айырмашылықты атап өтті. Осы орайда Еуропадан бастау алатын Америкаландырудың элитарлы және таңдаулы адамдар тобына бағытталғаны үшінәсерінің шектеулі екендігі туралы мәлімдеді. Америкаландыруға қатысты ойын жалғастыра отырып, оның жаңғыртуды жаһандық құбылысқа айналдырып, көпшілік қауымға арналғандығы туралы айтты. Бүгінгі таңда америка мәдениеті тағамнан музыкаға дейін кең таралған әлемдегі басым мәдениет болып табылады. Кейбір жергілікті мәдениеттердің бұл жағдайға қарсылық білдіріп, өз мәдениеттерін қорғау мақсатында мысалы, тез әзірленетін тамақтың орнына (fast food) баяу әзірленетін тамақ (slow food), өзімен бірге кішкентай ыдыста тамақ алып жүру (sefer taşı) сияқты ойлап тапқан түрлі ұсыныстары туралы айтты. Қоғамдардың өз құндылықтарын сақтай отырып дамуы мүмкін екендігіне баса көңіл аударылып, семинар соңына ерді.

Семинар соңы пікірталасқа ұласып, қатысушылар еуропаландыру және америкаландыру мәселелеріне қатысты өз пікірлерін білдірді.



Long Run Evaluation of Crude Oil Prices: Structural Breaks, Long Memory or Nonlinearity?

The crude oil is such an important energy type that forecasting its prices both in particular and in other types of energy prices in general over time has been widely discussed in the literature. Under the Hotelling modelling tradition, much of the controversy is linked to this choice of a stochastic process to represent the evolution of the exhaustible resource's price, and asks whether crude oil prices are best modelled in the long-run as a random walk or as mean reverting. With the thought that we could attain some useful inference about crude oil market and its supply and demand structure, the time-series properties of crude oil prices have been examined again in this book by applying some tests, such as the standard linear parametric tests of stationarity with structural breaks, the standard linear parametric tests of stationarity without structural breaks fractional unit root tests and parametric non-linear tests. The book examines the long run behavior of crude oil covering the 150-year period (1861-2010)...



Eurasia Outlook 2015: Economic, Social and Political Perspectives in Eurasia

Currently, it can be found some researches on advantages and disadvantages of the economic integration conducted within the frameworks of Eurasian Economic Union and more researches on addressing the Eurasia's energy routes development and considering the perspectives of developing bilateral and multilateral relations among the Eurasian countries. There is, however, still a strong necessity for publications contained a brief analytical outlook of the Eurasia containing aforementioned issues and the other several issues related to Eurasia from the economic, social and political perspectives. This book is intended as a general overview on the current events and ongoing changes in Eurasia. The analysis given in the book are designed to provide readers with the reliable information on a broad range of issues, including economics, finance, energy, transportation, international relations and politics. This book has practical use for wide range of readers contributing towards further research in the fields of Eurasian studies...

Akademik **Türkçe** Kursu

Avrasya Araştırma Enstitüsü 19 Ekim 2015 tarihinde Akademik Türkçe kursu verilmeye başlamıştır. Bu kursun amacı katılımcılara makale, bildiri, tez, kitap gibi akademik metinleri okuma, not alma, çıkarımda bulunma konularında eğitim vermektir. Kurslar başlangıç ve orta seviye olmak üzere iki seviyede olacaktır.

HAFTA İÇİ VE HAFTA SONU GRUPLARI

Kurs hakkında bilgi almak ve başvuru için aşağıdaki telefon numarasını arayabilirsiniz.

Başvuru Yeri:

Almalı Avdanı, Mametova 48, 050004 Almatı.

+7 (727) 279 24 26 içhat: 109

19 қазан 2015 жылы Еуразия ғылыми-зерттеу институты «Түрік тілін ғылыми тұрғыдан жетілдіру» курстары басталды. Курстың мақсаты тыңдармандарға мақаладағы, баяндамадағы, диссертация және кітаптардағы академиялық мәтіндерді оқуды, ғылыми тұрғыдан жазуды және қорытынды жасай білуді үйрету болып табылады. Қосымша мағлұмат алу және өтініштерді беру үшін төменде көрсетілген байланыстар арқылы хабарласуға болады. Курстар апта ішінде және апта соңында өткізіледі.

Өтініштерді қабылдау мекенжайы:

Алмалы ауданы, Мәметова көшесі 48, 050004 Алматы,

тел: +7 (727) 279 24 26

(ішкі нөмір 109)

Asya Avrupa / Азия Еуропа
(Haber – Yorum) / (Ақпараттық – сараптама)

Avrasya Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınıdır
Еуразия ғылыми-зерттеу институты басылымы

Nisan 2016 Sayı: 04
Сәуір 2016 жыл №04